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Abstract 
We review the literature on the diversification-performance (D-P) relationship to a) propose 
that the time is ripe for a renewed attack on understanding the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance, and b) outline a new approach to attacking the question. 
Our paper makes four main contributions.  First, through a review of the literature we establish 
the inherent complexities in the D-P relationship and the methodological challenges confronted 
by the literature in reaching its current conclusion of a non-linear relationship between 
diversification and performance. Second, we argue that to better guide managers the literature 
needs to develop along a complementary path – whereas past research has often focused on 
answering the big question of does diversification affect firm performance, this second path 
would focus more on identifying the precise micro-mechanisms through which diversification 
adds or subtracts value.  Third, we outline a new approach to the investigation of this topic, 
based on (a) identifying the precise underlying mechanisms through which diversification 
affects performance; (b) identifying performance outcomes that are “proximate” to the 
mechanism that the researcher is studying, and (c) identifying an appropriate research design 
that can enable a causal claim. Finally, we outline a set of directions for future research. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we review the literature on the diversification-performance relationship to propose 
two theses. First, we argue that the time is ripe for a renewed attack on understanding the 
relationship between diversification and firm performance. Second, we outline an approach to 
attacking the question that is different from the traditional multi-industry regression of 
performance against corporate diversification as a means of evaluating this relationship. Given 
that the diversification performance (hence D-P) relationship is one of the most extensively 
studied relationships in the field of strategy, and is also a relationship that has been extensively 
studied in the fields of economics, accounting and finance, the informed reader may well ask, 
why is this most mature of research streams worth a further or renewed effort. Don’t we know 
everything that is to be known about this relationship already? 
Our response to this extremely legitimate question is as follows. It is indeed true that we 
know a lot about this relationship, and its many nuances. Most importantly, research - taken 
cumulatively -suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between diversification and 
performance, with performance increasing with diversification up to a point and declining as 
diversification increases beyond a point (see the comprehensive meta-analysis by Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000) that substantiates this broad relationship using studies from both 
strategy and finance literatures and using both market and accounting performance measures). 
Indeed the efforts of the prior literature have uncovered a wealth of nuance on this relationship, 
as we highlight below.   
However, even armed with this knowledge, three sets of reasons arise that suggest that 
unpacking this relationship further and in a novel way may be very effective for advancing 
knowledge. 
First, it may be very helpful to build a finer-grained understanding of this relationship 
from the perspective of informing managers. Using aggregative measures, past work provides 
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insight into the D-P relationship; however, even with the progress made so far, this aggregation 
makes providing clean answers or practical advice to managers difficult, due to the complex 
nature of the underlying constructs of diversification and performance (and of the theoretical 
linkages between them). This “aggregation” issue can be seen to have several distinct 
dimensions:  
a) Diversification is a multifaceted construct. For instance, firms could be relatedly 
diversified in technology but not in markets. Correctly identifying a firm as relatedly 
or unrelatedly diversified to advise managers may not be straightforward. 
b) Performance is a multi-faceted construct as well (Miller, Washburn & Glick, 2013), 
with potentially many different aspects not necessarily strongly correlated with each 
other. Market share, growth, risk-adjusted returns, return on assets, equity, sales, new 
product introduction: the strategist and the manager are both interested in a variety of 
outcome measures. Diversification may affect these outcomes in different ways and 
with different temporal latencies.  
c) Diversification is driven by many different theoretical motivations and models (e.g. see 
Palich, Cardinal & Miller, 2000). Each theoretical perspective driving diversification 
may itself be enacted through a variety of different mechanisms, and these mechanisms 
may entail both benefits and costs created through diversification. For instance, 
economies of scope created by sharing a distribution system across product lines may 
have to be balanced with the increased complexity and coordination costs created by 
the same sharing of assets. Deriving the implications of these complex trade-offs for 
practice is not obvious. 
From a managerial perspective it would be helpful to have a clear outline of the multiple, 
distinct trade-offs along the above dimensions that are embodied in a diversification decision. 
However, to accomplish that in the context of the multiple mechanisms, multiple theoretical 
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logics, and multiple performance and diversification dimensions it would be helpful to conduct 
a more micro-analytic examination of D-P linkages. Unpacking the D-P relationship is thus the 
first motivation for renewed research.  
Second, the problem of contextual validity is an additional reason for renewed research in 
this area.  The extended literature on the D-P relationship has been conducted on a pre-internet 
business era and has largely focused on Western or developed institutional contexts. Both of 
these contextual “givens” that frame our current understanding of the D-P relationship, may 
not be completely valid in the world in which this relationship will be applied in the years to 
come. The dramatic development of information and communication technologies is likely to 
have significantly influenced the trade-off between the costs of organizing an activity inside 
the corporation and the costs of organizing the same activity outside the corporation. Thus, it 
suggests that the optimal scope of the firm may have changed in systematic (but hitherto 
unknown) ways in the post-internet era, another motivation for re-examining the D-P 
relationship.  
Moreover, an increasing share of global corporate activity and value-creation is today 
conducted through firms from emerging markets that come from a very different institutional 
milieu. For instance, while in 2000 only 21 of the Global Fortune 500 were headquartered in 
emerging markets, 132 were so headquartered by 2014 (Carroll, Bloomfield & Maher, 2014). 
Just as technology can modify the appropriate horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm so 
can institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; North, 1990) as they influence the costs of organizing 
between and within firms. Note that in this setting we are referring not to the 
internationalization of a given firm or a firms’ geographic boundaries; rather we are focusing 
on how the appropriate level of product-market diversification may be different in different 
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geographic contexts as they may imply different institutional regimes.1  Given that our research 
needs to be applicable to this increasingly important context of less developed institutional 
milieus, examining the robustness of observed relationships in these institutional contexts is 
important.  
A third reason to revisit the D-P relationship comes from the issue of establishing causality 
in the relationship. Although establishing causal relationships has always been the gold 
standard of science, new techniques and a greater emphasis on stronger tests before making 
causal claims has energized the strategy literature. In the context of the D-P relationship there 
has been a long-standing debate about the relative importance of selection and treatment effects 
going back to Rumelt’s (1974) “escape hypothesis” - according to which firms may be seeking 
diversification to escape their poor industries or poor performance. The advent of a variety of 
new techniques that allow quasi-experimental research designs provides an opportunity to 
revisit this question with new and different approaches. 
Our goal in this paper is to review the prior research to illuminate the dimensions of the 
problem uncovered by this past work and use the progress so far to suggest a complementary 
research approach to attack this question. In this process we hope to enthuse scholars to build 
on this most critical question, which still remains significant in its theoretical and practical 
import. The past research has provided a strong foundation for these efforts by identifying some 
of the core factors and conditions that are relevant to understanding and interpreting this 
relationship, as we will elaborate later in the paper. However, to unpack this relationship further 
and make it more transparent we argue that an additional fine-grained attack on the 
fundamental mechanisms that connect diversification to performance would be a useful 
complement to the already and ongoing research efforts with coarser but big picture variables. 
                                                          
1 The question of appropriate levels of geographic diversification is not one that we address in this paper but the 
interested reader is directed to the very complete review provided by Cardinal, Miller and Palich, 2011. 
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Identifying and evaluating such mechanisms in terms of their attendant benefits and costs 
would highlight the trade-offs in a given diversification decision more clearly, and thus enable 
managers to make better decisions. Further, clarity at the level of the mechanism may also help 
address the other two issues raised above – the implications of variations in the institutional 
context of diversification and the issue of causal direction as we outline in more detail later in 
the paper.  
In the sections that follow we explore the available research evidence on the D-P 
relationship. We conclude that: 
a) although examination of the D-P relationship has been frequent, findings across 
individual studies have often been inconsistent - though the pattern of results taken together 
suggest a curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance as outlined earlier 
(see Palich et al. 2000);  
b) the reasons for which diversification is conducted are very varied and often not 
consistent with each other (which could partly explain the above mentioned inconsistency 
across the results of individual studies);  
c) any type of diversification move entails not just synergies but also significant costs 
and, hence, the net benefit of any diversification move is likely to be contingent on the relative 
balance between these benefits and costs;  
d) while past research has examined the issue of benefits and costs, it has not very 
systematically identified, classified, and measured the costs arising from diversification or very 
tightly examined the specific mechanisms through which diversification creates value;  
e) performance and diversification are both complex phenomena and the different 
motives for diversification may confer their benefits and impose their costs on different 
outcome variables (thus suggesting that a single-variable outcome study may not capture the 
net effects of both benefits and costs).  
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The previous five sub-propositions suggest that a more focused attack on understanding 
the D-P link may be beneficial.  Specifically, we outline a mechanism-based approach that will 
be helpful in building a better understanding of the benefits and costs associated with 
broadening or narrowing firm scope.  
The paper is structured in three core sections. In the next section, “Reviewing Research 
on Diversification”, we provide a detailed overview of existing research on diversification in 
the form of three sub-sections - the first, reviewing research on the impact of diversification on 
performance; the second, reviewing the literature that has examined the contingencies that 
affect the diversification-performance relationship; the third, reviewing studies that emphasize 
the methodological concerns that are relevant in interpreting the diversification-performance 
relationship. In the subsequent section, “Revitalizing Research On Diversification: A 
Mechanisms-Based Perspective”, we draw upon existing research to outline a new mechanism- 
based approach to the investigation of this topic that aims to revitalize research in this critical 
domain of strategy. We explain the foundations of the new approach and outline the sources of 
new energy in the study of diversification, which make this new approach particularly timely 
now. The result of our analysis is a general scheme that we depict in Figure 1 and corresponding 
Tables 1 through 5.  
In the final section “Conclusions and Future Research Directions”, we build on these 
analyses to outline a set of directions for future research. 
---------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
 
Reviewing Research on Diversification 
The Relevance of the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
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Any review of the D-P relationship may be well served by first asking: “why does this 
relationship matter?” If there is clarity on the reasons why the relationship matters, then these 
very reasons should provide guidance in directing research efforts. In the context of the 
diversification-performance relationship, understanding whether and how diversification 
affects performance is important because diversification is one of the most common decisions 
made by firms and entails significant corporate resources. Evaluating how effectively these 
resources are utilized and identifying the conditions under which diversification enhances 
economic performance is then critical. Addressing this objective would suggest that one goal 
of diversification research should be to provide guidance for resource allocation decisions in 
the context of firm scope. Broad rules of guidance - such as whether related/unrelated 
diversification is generally beneficial for financial performance - are useful from this 
perspective. However, given the complexities identified earlier in defining omnibus constructs 
such as diversification and performance, establishing clarity on the key contingencies and 
trade-offs that different types of diversification moves entail and providing a framework that 
can assist in specific decisions is another desirable goal.  
Relatedly, we note that diversification is pursued by different firms for different reasons. 
Results from studies aggregating across these motivations are helpful, but from the standpoint 
of the individual manager making a decision, providing insight into the trade-offs that she is 
likely to confront in the context of her own specific motivation for a given diversification move 
would be helpful as well. Under these conditions, identifying the benefits and costs associated 
with each motivation for diversification is a useful exercise. This logic underlines our call for 
a focus on mechanisms.   
 
Methodology 
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In the sections that follow we explore the available research evidence on the D-P relationship. 
In order to identify the research to include in this review, we began by selecting a sample of 
world renowned journals for their impact and publication quality in the domains of 
management (Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Management Science, Organization Science, Strategic 
Management Journal); finance (Journal of Finance,  Journal of Financial Economics, Review 
of Financial Studies); economics (American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Rand Journal of Economics) and accounting 
(Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Accounting Review).   
We were interested in identifying all articles published in these journals studying the 
diversification performance relationship. To this purpose, we used Business Source Complete 
to identify all articles in the above mentioned journals that, either in the title, abstract or 
keywords reported the word “diversification” and at least one word referring to performance2. 
These criteria led us to identify 440 articles. We read the abstracts of all the articles to identify 
the papers that were actually studying the D-P relationship and we excluded all articles 
studying other relationships or using these terms as general labels. In some cases reading the 
abstract to determine whether the specific article should or should not be included in the sample 
was not sufficient; hence, we read the full article. We excluded from the sample the papers 
focusing on international diversification as well, since the set of mechanisms relating 
international diversification to firm performance are largely not overlapping with those 
affecting firm diversification (for a recent comprehensive review of research in this area, please 
refer to Cardinal, Miller and Palich, 2011). This led us to select 154 articles. Finally, we added 
                                                          
2 To identify the set of different words used in management, finance, economics and accounting to refer to firm 
performance in connection with diversification, we conducted a pilot search in which we identified thirty core 
articles across disciplines focusing on the D-P relationship and used them to identify a set of recurring keywords 
referring to performance. The list of words identified included: value, performance, profit, sales, premium, 
discount, Tobin, valuation, risk, innovation, return, ROA, ROE, ROS, ROI, Jensen, Treynor, Sharpe, share, 
earning, corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
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to this selection papers that were cited in the selected articles or papers of which we had 
previous knowledge.  
While we are aware of the fact that this selection is certainly not exhaustive, we believe 
that the selection criteria chosen ensure it is reasonably representative of the research conducted 
so far in the field. Although the focus of this article is on the D-P relationship, understanding 
the theoretical motivations underlying diversification may itself be useful to interpret the D-P 
relationship. Accordingly, to supplement our main set of collected articles we also reviewed 
the broader literature on diversification to identify the various theoretical motivations for 
diversification and the mechanisms implicit in each motive that could link diversification with 
performance.  Since this was not the primary focus of this article we did not however review 
all articles of this type as that would have entailed a much larger scope than this article was 
intended to cover. The goal of this component of the study was to identify the main motivations 
underlying diversification rather than provide an exhaustive survey of that topic.   
 
Diversification and Firm Performance  
The most common approach to studying the diversification-performance link has been to look 
at diversification and evaluate its impact on measures of performance. Studying this 
relationship has been an extremely fecund endeavor with literally dozens of studies having 
focused on this issue.  
The first issue that arises in this setting is the meaning and definition of firm performance.  
In a very thoughtful article Miller, Washburn and Glick (2013) highlight that firm performance 
can be approached conceptually in at least three different ways: a) as a latent construct that is 
reflected in the shared variance of multiple correlated variables (p. 951), b) as a domain of 
separate constructs, that does not exist as a meaningful general construct (p. 952), and c) as an 
aggregate construct with multiple components that can be reconciled and aggregated (p. 952). 
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Inconsistency in the approach to conceptualizing performance between theorizing and testing 
(for instance theorizing about a latent construct but testing an aggregate construct) leads to 
difficulties of interpretation and knowledge accumulation.  
In the current context their argument would suggest that rather than seek a single 
overarching D-P relationship, for interpretation and accumulation of knowledge it would be 
useful to consider the effect of diversification on individual constructs that span the domain of 
firm performance, rather than as a single latent construct or single aggregate construct. We 
believe this to be so for two reasons. First, as they note, the different measures of performance 
are not very highly correlated among themselves; in their study across 290 articles “there were 
no persuasive instances of authors finding enough shared variance among non-perceptual 
measures to form a latent performance variable”. This seems to favor ruling out the first 
approach – the latent construct approach. Further, the aggregate construct approach would 
require reconciling the different potential measures and then aggregating across them. This in 
turn would require the researcher to have an understanding of how the different measures relate 
to each other and can substitute for each other in some additive or multiplicative fashion. Given 
the current state of management research such an understanding is not on the horizon. How 
revenue growth relates to market share and stock performance cannot be easily captured in 
some algebraic expression that could be applied across all studies.  
A second argument for focusing on the individual constructs approach comes from the 
very varied nature of the mechanisms that underlie the diversification-performance link. As we 
shall detail in a section below, diversification is undertaken for different theoretical reasons 
and -within and across the various theoretical inducements for diversification- a variety of 
different mechanisms affecting performance emerge, affecting different performance outcomes 
in different ways.  From the perspective of providing guidance and clear research 
conceptualization and interpretation, together these arguments suggest that examining the 
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effects of diversification on a variety of different outcome variables would be of value. 
Accordingly, in our review we distinguish between the different dimensions of performance 
and evaluate the effect of diversification on each separate dimension. A classification of the 
studies investigating the impact of diversification on different performance measures is 
reported in Table 1.  
 
Diversification and accounting measures of performance. The field of strategic 
management has studied the connection between diversification and accounting measures of 
performance particularly closely. Relevant management work in this area can be dated back to 
the seminal work of Wrigley (1970) and Rumelt (1974). Building upon Wrigley (1970), Rumelt 
defined a classification based on four major categories (i.e. single business, dominant business, 
related business and unrelated business) to create a typology of firms’ diversification patterns. 
In contrast with the earlier industrial organization literature that reported a non-significant 
relationship between diversification and performance (e.g. Arnould, 1969; Gort, 1962; 
Markham, 1973), Rumelt’s results showed a positive association between diversification 
strategy and profitability (return on capital and return on equity) and a variety of additional 
performance measures including growth in earnings, and standard deviation in earnings per 
share. Broadly speaking, he found support that related diversification outperformed unrelated, 
with dominant-constrained and related-constrained categories outperforming other categories.  
This positive result generated substantial interest in subsequent research but was soon 
challenged by conflicting results. While some studies confirmed a positive association between 
diversification and performance, they challenged the superiority of the related diversification 
strategy over the unrelated diversification strategy (Bettis, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985). In attempting to resolve this basic conflict, 
subsequent research followed several different paths. Although researchers continued to 
14 
 
address the basic relationship, they also focused on a variety of different possibilities, such as 
the relationship being contingent on other variables, possible selection issues, omitted 
variables, etc. For instance, researchers considered the possibility that performance differences 
might themselves be related to industry effects (e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Lecraw, 1984; Park, 2003) or market structure (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981) or that 
the relationship might be fundamentally endogenous (e.g. Rumelt, 1982; Dubofski & 
Varadarajan, 1987; Park, 2003). We briefly review the key attempts along these various vectors 
as scholars sought to reconcile prior conflicting results in subsequent separate sub-sections; 
however, in this sub-section - for continuity - we focus largely on the studies that used 
accounting measures of profitability trying to address the basic question.   
Multiple studies focused on addressing the observed conflicting results of prior work on 
the basic D-P relationship reaching contrasting conclusions themselves. Several studies found 
no significant performance difference between firms with differing levels of diversification 
(e.g. Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987; Johnson & Thomas 1987; Keats & Hitt, 1988), others 
found that diversified firms outperformed focused firms but there was no difference between 
the performance of related and unrelated diversifiers (Grant & Jammine, 1988) and yet, others 
found that diversified firms had lower profits than undiversified firms (Amit & Livnat, 1988). 
In another twist, scholars identified variations across accounting performance measures with 
Simmonds (1990) finding a positive effect of relatedness on Return on Assets (ROA) but not 
Return on Equity (ROE), or Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). Hence, at the turn of the 
millennium - after almost three decades of research - the debate on the effect of diversification 
on performance was not resolved, though evidence was adding up on both sides (Palich, 
Cardinal & Miller, 2000). 
Adopting a novel take on the problem, in perhaps the most comprehensive study of the 
issue, Palich and colleagues used a meta-analytic approach on a sample of 55 studies (Palich, 
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Cardinal & Miller, 2000) finding that, on the basis of accounting performance measures 
(growth and profitability), a curvilinear relationship best summarized the data, with related 
diversifiers outperforming both focused firms and unrelated diversifiers. A study by Mayer and 
Whittington (2003), shortly thereafter, also provided some supporting evidence for related 
constrained diversifiers outperforming the other Rumelt categories. 
 
Diversification and market-based measures of performance. Departing from strategic 
management research that focused mainly on accounting measures of performance, some 
scholars in the mid-80s started to investigate the connection between diversification and 
market-based measures of performance. A first set of scholars in these areas investigated the 
relationship between diversification and risk-adjusted-return measures. Dubofsky and 
Varadarajan, (1987), replicating an earlier study (Michel & Shaked, 1984) find evidence that 
when risk-adjusted-market-based measures of performance are taken into account - i.e. 
Sharpe's (1996); Treynor's (1965) levered and unlevered measures, Jensen's (1968) alpha - 
unrelated diversifiers are better performers than related diversifiers, a result contrasted by 
subsequent studies. For example, Lubatkin and Rogers (1989) show that firms diversifying in 
a constrained manner demonstrate significantly higher levels of risk-adjusted returns and 
significantly lower levels of risk. One possible explanation posited for this conflict is the 
different historical period analyzed by the two studies (e.g. 1950-1970s for Lubatkin and 
Rogers (1989) versus 1975-1981 for Dubofsky and Varadarajan, (1987).  
A second set of scholars, instead, investigated the relationship between diversification and 
excess value, in order to understand whether the market associates diversified firms with a 
premium or a discount relative to collections of standalone businesses in the same industries. 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) focused on diversification using a competitive advantage 
logic and theorized that the further firms diversify from their current scope, the more they 
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diversify away from efficiency and from their area of competitive advantage. As a result, 
diversification should reduce the rents for such firms. In line with this prediction, they found 
that a higher level of diversification is associated with a lower Tobin’s q. Evidence of a 
“diversification discount” has also been found by other scholars, often in the finance literature. 
For example, Lang and Stulz (1994), show a negative relationship between firm diversification 
and Tobin’s q throughout the 1980s. Further investigation of the mechanism behind this 
phenomenon led the authors to conclude that the effect might have been caused by industry 
effects; in fact, rather than interpreting the result as an indication of the fact that diversification 
might hurt performance, the authors note that more diversified firms in the sample appeared to 
perform poorly before becoming diversified, advancing the very relevant insight – that was 
subsequently picked up by further research - that the diversification discount might be 
explained by endogeneity.  
Berger and Ofek (1995) compared the sum of the stand-alone values for the individual 
business segments in which the firm is present to the actual firm value, identifying a value loss 
between 13% and 15% for diversifying firms, which becomes smaller when the segments of 
the diversified firm are in the same two-digit SIC code. Soon thereafter, looking at the period 
from 1961 to 1976 (i.e. the period in which a high diversification trend was observed in the 
market) Servaes (1996) found no evidence that diversified companies were valued at a 
premium over single-segment firms. Instead, he identified a diversification discount that 
declined to zero during the 1970s. Studies also identified several mechanisms to which this 
diversification discount could be attributed: a) capital misallocation in terms of cross-
subsidization of bad businesses by good businesses in diversified firms (Scharfstein, 1998; 
Shin & Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes & Zingales, 2000), b) agency problems unchecked by poor 
governance structures (Anderson, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Bates, 1998; Palia, 1999), c) industry 
specific productivity that does not transfer across industry borders as a firm diversifies 
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(Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002). However, in contrast to some of the above studies, Denis, 
Denis and Sarin (1997) found limited evidence of value loss for diversified firms. One issue 
that makes reconciliation of these studies difficult is that, while the strategy literature has 
commonly distinguished between related and unrelated diversification, such a distinction has 
not always been made in the finance literature. 
In their comprehensive meta-analytic study mentioned earlier, Palich et al. (2000) also 
looked at the effect of diversification on market measures (risk-adjusted returns and unadjusted 
market value) of performance. They found support for the inverted-U relationship as in the 
accounting-measures-based studies. However, several of the market-measure-based studies in 
the sample underlying the meta-analysis did not provide enough information to assess the 
results as completely as was possible with the accounting measures. A set of subsequent studies 
have argued for methodological concerns as an explanation for the recorded diversification 
discount (Campa & Kedia, 2002; Gomes & Livdan, 2004). We reflect on those later in the 
paper, when we examine the methodological issues identified by scholars that make studying 
this question difficult.  
 
Diversification and “other” performance outcomes. In addition to looking at accounting and 
market measures of firm performance, prior research has also investigated other firm outcomes 
such as growth and innovation. The argument for examining these emerges from the 
recognition that changes in firm scope could influence many of these outcomes as well.  
Growth. Early studies found evidence that conglomerate firms were growing much faster 
than other firms on many performance dimensions (Weston & Mansinghka, 1971). 
Subsequently though, Palepu (1985) did not observe any significant cross-sectional variation 
in profitability between diversifying and non-diversifying firms, nor between firms engaging 
in related versus unrelated diversification. However, his study showed that firms with 
18 
 
predominantly related diversification display significantly better profit growth than firms with 
predominantly unrelated diversification. A recent result in this domain is provided by Levinthal 
and Wu (2010) who highlight the importance of recognizing that firms seek to maximize total 
profit growth- not profit margins or Tobin’s Q, the two most commonly used measures in 
research. As they show, a given diversification move can increase total profits and be rational 
for a company facing a mature market, but would result in lower average profit margin and 
Tobin’s Q.  In the context of intra-industry diversification, Zahavi and Lavie (2013) show the 
existence of a U-shaped relationship between product diversity and sales growth, due to the 
fact that growth is initially limited by the effect of negative transfer effects, which are 
eventually attenuated by economies of scope, an effect that becomes more pronounced with 
the intensity of technological investment and which gets attenuated by firms’ accumulated 
intra-industry diversification experience.   
Research and development (R&D) and innovation. A fairly prolific stream of research has 
emerged on the impact of diversification on R&D intensive firms and in particular on their 
innovative performance. The literature has looked at both the effect of diversification on the 
incentives to conduct research as well as the outcomes achieved, conditional on having 
conducted research in a diversified firm. The literature on diversification and innovation has 
been addressed in another Annals article (Ahuja, Lampert & Tandon, 2008) so we do not 
comprehensively review it here, except to note the key takeaways.  
Although early literature highlighted the incentive-enhancement effects of diversification 
- in that a diversified firm could afford to invest in R&D given the uncertainty of research, 
because its broader scope permits a higher likelihood of being able to utilize the results (Nelson, 
1959)-  more recent literature has argued for a more complex and nuanced view. In particular, 
the received work suggests that diversification may have distinctive effects on innovative 
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effort, innovative productivity, the commercial potential of inventions, and even the direction 
of technological efforts.  
From an incentives-to-conduct-research perspective, Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) argue that 
the tight financial control that characterizes M-form, large, diversified firms tends to induce 
these firms to engage in a risk-minimizing and short-term-oriented decision making process, 
and hence, reduces investment in R&D. In line with this prediction, the study finds that U-form 
firms that are less diversified tend to have a higher R&D investment compared to more 
diversified M-form firms. However, subsequent research also suggests that – despite the 
change in incentives associated with diversification – firms are able to adapt their structure in 
order to foster risk-taking at the divisional level (Cardinal & Opler, 1995). Consistent with this, 
Cardinal and Opler (1995) do not find any statistical significant effect of diversification on the 
number of new products introduced per dollar by a sample of firms active in research.  
From the innovative productivity perspective, research emphasizes the opportunity for 
resource sharing and cross-fertilization offered by diversification (Miller, Fern & Cardinal, 
2007; Wu, 2013). Mirroring the inverted U relationship between diversification and financial 
performance, but for different reasons, Ahuja and Katila (2001) find that moderate degrees of 
technological overlap between acquiring and acquired firms are associated with the greatest 
post-merger innovative productivity. The use of interdivisional knowledge tends to be 
associated with a greater positive impact of invention on subsequent technological 
developments than the impact of knowledge originated either inside the division or outside the 
boundaries of the firm (Miller, Fern & Cardinal, 2007). In other words inventions spawned by 
knowledge recombination across divisions tend to be most impactful in determining the 
trajectory of subsequent technical changes. In line with this, Cardinal (2001) shows that 
knowledge diversity, and in particular scientific diversity, is critical to drug research and 
facilitates the creation of new knowledge via cross-fertilization, leading to innovation. Cardinal 
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and Hatfield (2000) show that diversification influences the productivity of research centers 
for firms, with focused firms benefitting more from setting up research centers than diversified 
firms. In line with the idea that diversification affects innovation by changing firms’ 
opportunities to access resources, Kim, Arthurs, Sahaym and Cullen, (2013) recognize the 
importance of the fit between the type of diversification and the technological search strategy 
conducted by the firm. Their results show that a related diversification strategy tends to lead to 
greater innovation when firms use a narrow technological search strategy; however a broader 
technological search strategy is associated with superior performance in the context of 
unrelated diversification. 
Diversification can also influence the commercial potential that firms are able to create 
for their inventions. Novelli (2015) shows that diversified knowledge in firms’ knowledge 
bases is associated with the identification of a higher number of variations to their inventions  
and of opportunities to apply those inventions (as reflected by patent claims); however, as 
relatedness increases, the opportunities identified tend to be concentrated in specific areas as 
opposed to being spread across multiple technological domains. An association between the 
latter outcome and firms’ superior ability to appropriate the returns from their inventions is 
subsequently identified (Novelli, 2015). Wu (2013) shows that resource sharing tends to lead 
to higher innovative performance at the corporate level than at the individual division level.  
Another study suggests that it may be worthwhile to consider the effects of diversification-
type (related or unrelated) on the direction of innovation (Ahuja, Lampert & Tandon, 2013). 
Studying the reactions of firms to the oil price shock of 1980 this study finds that unrelated 
diversifiers chose to invest in paradigmatic (or established) technologies while related 
diversifiers were more willing to invest in paradigm-changing or nascent technologies, a 
tendency the authors attribute to differing decision-making mechanisms in the two types of 
companies. Summarizing across the above studies we note that the received literature suggests 
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multiple complex effects of diversification on innovation, rather than an unambiguous simple 
directional effect. 
Survival. Firm survival is another performance dimension investigated by some studies. 
Mitchell and Singh (1993) find that incumbents that expand into new subfields survive longer 
than incumbents who don’t. Stern and Henderson (2004) find that the relationship between 
diversification and survival is conditional, i.e. it depends on the amount of environmental 
change created by the dynamic of other firms in the industry innovating and diversifying. 
However, Lange, Boivie and Henderson (2009) suggest that established firms diversifying into 
a new industry tend to generate subsidiaries that are weaker survivors than independent 
startups, suggesting that corporate parents tend to hinder the survival of their own offspring. 
These results once again are indicative of the complexity of the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance.  
Riskiness. The relationship between diversification and risk is not straightforward. 
Building on the intuition from financial economics that diversification (in particular unrelated 
diversification) could be associated with risk reduction, some studies have investigated the 
relationship between diversification and risk; however their results have often conflicted. On 
the one hand, unrelated diversification that combines businesses with different structural 
characteristics, could in principle lead to a stabilization of earnings (e.g. Bettis & Hall, 1982). 
However, Bettis and Hall (1982) find no evidence of a significant relationship between 
diversification and earnings volatility (measured as the standard deviation of ROA).  
A second possible manifestation of this benefit would be the “co-insurance” effect.  Since 
diversified firms may face a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy and their unrelated 
businesses provide additional collateral, unrelated diversifiers may be able to either carry more 
debt or realize a lower rate on the debt they carry (Lewellen, 1971).  Although some finance 
research has found support for this, in that conglomerates were found to have higher debt than 
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non-conglomerates (Melicher & Rush, 1974), the overall takeaway is not as clear. For instance, 
Montgomery and Singh (1984) showed that the systematic risk of unrelated diversifiers is 
significantly higher than that of the market portfolio, possibly because unrelated diversifiers 
carry higher debt and may have lower market power than focused firms. Hence, while unrelated 
diversification may reduce idiosyncratic risk, it may be resulting in higher systematic risk on 
account of the higher debt being carried.  
Other studies too have provided mixed results. Studying related and unrelated mergers, 
Amit and Livnat (1988) use a measure that takes the underlying economic attributes as well as 
the impact on the business cycle explicitly into account and find that pure financial 
diversification is associated with a reduction in risk and with an increase in leverage.  Lubatkin 
and O’Neill (1987) find that, while all kind of mergers tend to increase the level of unsystematic 
risk, related mergers significantly reduce the level of systematic and total risk. Barton (1988) 
too finds that unrelated diversification is associated with a higher level of systematic risk. 
However, in a subsequent study on mergers, by controlling for the systematic risk of the target 
firm and correcting for potential heteroskedasticity, Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990) found that 
related mergers induced a downwards shift in the systematic risk for related bidders; unrelated 
mergers appear to be effective at reducing stockholders risk.  In general this stream in the 
literature has raised several interesting possibilities but defies a conclusive takeaway – 
potentially making it ripe for further work.   
  
Considerations and Implications for Future Research. One way of integrating this 
research on the impact of diversification on different types of outcomes is to consider them as 
intermediate outcomes between diversification and value-creation. For instance, diversification 
affecting innovation or higher growth could in turn be reflected in subsequent value creation, 
for instance through better products or processes that enhance profit, or in the case of growth, 
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that lead to a higher earnings multiple. Yet, even this brief survey should have indicated that 
the underlying relationships between diversification and such intermediate outcomes are quite 
complex. For instance, diversification affects innovation levels, type, locus (center versus 
division), and is moderated by organizational structure and search strategy among other factors. 
In summary, our conclusion from the review of the D-P literature so far suggests that the 
underlying relationships are quite complex from the perspective of managers seeking guidance.  
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
The Contingencies Affecting the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
A second strand exploring the diversification–performance linkage, with a view to reconciling 
the conflicting findings of the original work on the D-P relationship, focused on the role of 
moderators possibly affecting the relationship. In this phase researchers started acknowledging 
that the relationship between diversification and performance is more nuanced and that it is not 
univocal but rather contingent: diversification can have different effects on organizational 
performance depending on the presence of some factors that moderate the relationship. What 
is interesting about this stream of literature is that it starts focusing attention on the underlying 
mechanisms that relate diversification and performance. A classification of the studies within 
this research set is reported in Table 2. This research identified three main classes of 
contingencies: (1) characteristics of the industry/ market in which a firm operates and the 
businesses into which a firm diversifies; (2) characteristics of the diversifying firms; (3) 
characteristics of the diversification move.  
Characteristics of the Industry/Market in which Firms Operate or Diversify. A first set of 
studies has emphasized that the relationship between diversification and performance is 
contingent on the characteristics of the industry/ market in which a firm operates and the 
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businesses in which a firm diversifies. For instance, some studies emphasize that a 
diversification strategy may be more valuable under certain economic (e.g. Kuppuswamy & 
Villalonga, 2016; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1986) or industrial 
conditions (Davis & Thomas, 1993; Mitchell & Singh, 1993). For instance, Santalo’ and 
Becerra (2008) argued and presented evidence that the effects of diversification would differ 
across different industries. In their theory, industries differ in the importance of hard versus 
soft information with the latter being difficult to communicate across firm boundaries. In 
industries where soft information is pervasive, diversifiers might have a funding advantage as 
they can access resources more easily (from the corporate center through cross-subsidization) 
than firms that are focused, which must instead access the capital markets wherein they may 
have difficulty communicating soft information. They also posit a second possible mechanism: 
industries that deal with only a few players in an upstream or downstream industry would be 
more at risk of hold up; hence, vertically integrated firms in these industries could post a 
superior performance relative to focused firms. Consistent with their arguments, they find that 
there is a diversification discount in industries in which specialized firms enjoy a large market 
share while there is evidence of a diversification premium in industries in which diversified 
firms enjoy a large market, suggesting that industry characteristics are critical in determining 
whether the diversification-performance relationship is positive or not.  
Another set of contingencies that the literature has identified relates to the differential 
ability of diversified and focused firms to raise external capital in certain contexts. The basic 
line of reasoning is that diversified firms may have higher debt capacity due to the already-
mentioned co-insurance effect (Lewellen, 1971) and that whenever there is a financing 
constraint (e.g. in a crisis) this debt capacity can enable them to stay closer to their optimal 
debt levels whereas focused firms may be unable to achieve them (Dimitrov & Tice, 2006; 
Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016). More broadly this argument can be extended to other 
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contexts wherein there are capital market inefficiencies, such as emerging markets, wherein 
diversified business groups can raise capital more easily (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), or in 
cyclical industries where capital sufficiency may vary significantly over the business cycle 
(Erdorf et al. 2013).  Klein (2001) found that the level of the diversification discount varies 
over the years: while conglomerate were good performers in the 1960s, their performance 
declined in the 1970s. These authors suggest the possibility that the performance of diversified 
firms, especially unrelated ones, might depend on the relative efficiency of internal versus 
external capital markets over time. Another interesting insight emphasized by research in this 
stream concerns the fact that the performance of diversified firms is contingent on the 
characteristics of their rivals such as the rivals’ own diversification strategy (Anjos & Fracassi, 
2015; Li & Greenwood, 2004; Santalo’ & Becerra, 2008) or the environmental change created 
by the innovation and diversification dynamics of other firms in the industry (Stern & 
Henderson, 2004).  
Characteristics of Firms. A second set of studies emphasizes that the relationship between 
diversification and performance is contingent on the characteristics of firms and in particular 
the internal arrangements that enable firms to actually take advantage of the benefits of 
diversification. Some studies acknowledge that the underlying level of diversity across 
businesses increases the complexity in managing a diversified corporation and exploiting the 
benefits of this strategy, with a depressing effect on performance (Capon et al. 1988; Harrison, 
Hall & Nargundkar, 1993; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Rajan, Servaes & Zingales, 2000). 
On the other hand, some studies find than when specific types of corporate diversity are taken 
into account (e.g. technological diversity, Miller, 2006) a positive relationship between 
diversification and Tobin’s q emerges.  
Within this stream of research, a group of studies focuses on the importance of 
organizational structure in determining the success of diversification by reducing the costs of 
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transactions across different businesses and giving firms the possibility of sharing resources 
across businesses, leading to the realization of synergies (e.g. Cardinal & Hatfield, 2000; Chang 
& Choi, 1988; Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1992; Hoskisson, Harrison & Dubofsky, 1991; 
Hoskisson, Hill & Hitt, 1991; Klein & Saidenberg, 2010; Markides & Williamson, 1996). 
Building upon Chandler’s seminal work (1962), scholars recognized that diversified firms have 
often shown a tendency to adopt multidivisional organizational structures assigning 
responsibilities for different businesses to autonomous divisions.  Scholars have investigated 
the association between the structure chosen and the type of diversification selected. The results 
are consistent with the idea that the M-form of implementation tends to decrease the rate of 
return and the market evaluation for related diversifiers and increase the rate of return for 
unrelated diversifiers (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). 
Hence, failing to adopt the right organizational structure could lead to underperformance.  
In the same fashion, organizational arrangements such as compensation policies and 
managerial incentives can affect the implementation of diversification and, in this way, 
determine its success (e.g. Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Gary, 2005). 
Building on the same underlying logic that the way in which diversification is actually 
implemented within firms and the extent to which its potential is effectively realized in the 
implementation exert a key role in determining performance, some studies have found that the 
level of firms’ investment in Information Technology (IT) plays an important role in 
determining their performance (Chari, Devaraj & David, 2008; Ray, Xue, & Barney, 2013). 
Other firm-level contingencies that are relevant in determining the performance effects of 
diversification are the actual search strategy used by the firm (Kim et al. 2013), the stage of the 
firm life cycle (Arikan & Stulz, 2016), the extent of disclosure (e.g. Bens & Monahan, 2004; 
Franco, Urcan & Vasvari, 2016 - due to the fact that disclosure plays a monitoring role in 
disciplining management’s investment decisions), the level of debt (O'Brien et al. 2014).  
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Characteristics of the Diversification Move. Finally, a third set of contingencies that have 
been identified by prior research as moderating the relationship between diversification and 
performance are the characteristics of the diversification approach itself, such as the 
diversification mode (e.g. Busija, O’Neill & Zeithaml, 1997; Lamont & Anderson, 1985; 
Simmonds, 1990), the motive (e.g. Anand & Singh, 1997; Hill & Hansen, 1991) and the actual 
level and type of synergies that are realized through the move itself (e.g. Barroso & Giarratana, 
2013; Chang, 1996; Davis et al. 1992; Ilinitch & Zeithaml, 1995; Tanriverdi & Lee, 2008; 
Tanriverdi & Venkataraman, 2005). Once again, the implicit theme brought forward by this 
stream of research is that it is not the fact of diversifying itself that leads to a superior 
performance but the extent to which the context (at the business- firm or diversification move 
level) provides the opportunity to activate a set of value-creating mechanisms.  
Considerations and Implications for Future Research. The abiding picture that emerges 
from this section of the review is that the relationship between diversification and performance 
is an extremely nuanced one; although knowing the main effect is helpful, for managers to fully 
utilize this information in making decisions probably more fine grained trade-offs need to be 
highlighted.  
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
 
The Methodological Concerns Affecting the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
A third strand of research has attempted to reconcile the conflicting results by closely 
examining the specific methodological choices of the various studies in this area. A review of 
this prior research is relevant because it allows us to understand prior results, but also because 
it provides a review of the methodological advancements of research in this area and of the 
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various aspects that need to be taken into account by researchers that want to continue research 
in this domain. A classification and synthesis of the studies that contributed in this direction is 
reported in Table 3.  
 
Measuring diversification. In the attempt to clarify the nature of the relationship between 
diversification and performance, an important debate concerns the measurement of firms’ 
diversification strategy. Prominent among the issues is recognition of the “trade-off between 
finding a measure that guarantees richness of information versus one that ensures objectivity 
and replicability” in the measurement of diversification (e.g. Montgomery, 1982). In this 
respect, the earliest studies used SIC-based product count measures (e.g. Arnould, 1969; Gort, 
1962; Markham, 1973) that allowed effort and time efficiency in calculation but where the 
different categories did not reflect the extent of relationship or distance between them. Such 
studies for the most part did not find evidence of a diversification-performance effect 
suggesting that perhaps the simple counting of product categories was too crude to accurately 
capture the underlying complexity of the ties between businesses.  
Building on Wrigley’s (1970) work, Rumelt (1974) built a somewhat more qualitative 
information-infused set of measures based on a two-tier breakdown of categories. In Rumelt’s 
(and Wrigley’s) approach, judgment was introduced into the measures by explicitly asking 
whether the individual businesses in a corporation were related to each other after an analysis 
of the company’s history and the “logic” of the business’s relationship with other businesses. 
As noted earlier, using these measures, Rumelt found support for the “relatedness helps 
performance” thesis.  However, this measurement schema - while moving beyond the pure 
count of businesses approach- was both labor-intensive and introduced subjective assessment 
from the researcher.   
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In attempts to combine the benefits of both objectivity and richness of information, 
subsequent studies developed multiple diversification indexes including a Herfindahl index of 
diversification (Berry, 1974); a hierarchical classification system using 4 digits and 2 digits 
SIC codes to recognize related and unrelated diversification (Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 
1987); the Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure (1979), accounting for the number of product 
segments in which the firm operates, the distribution of total sales across the product segment 
and the degree of relatedness among the various product segments; and the concentric index 
(Caves, 1980; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). In the attempt to improve measurement 
accuracy, multiple subsequent studies offered variations on these measures (e.g. Amit & 
Livnat, 1989; Davis & Duhaime, 1992; Davis & Thomas, 1993) and used them in different 
ways, such as calculating the measures based on line of business data versus segment data (e.g. 
Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Palepu, 1985); longitudinal versus cross 
sectional (Bergh, 1995); and different levels of analysis (Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997).  
The validity of different measures has been assessed by several studies (e.g. see Chatterjee 
and Blocher, 1992; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Moesel, 1993; Lubatkin, Merchant & 
Srinivasan, 1993; Hall & St. John, 1994; Montgomery, 1982; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982; Robins 
& Wiersema, 2003 for extensive reviews and comparison), which overall suggest that - 
although the different measures are characterized by a good level of consistency-  they tend to 
capture slightly different aspects of the phenomenon and should be used accordingly.  
For example, Pitts and Hopkins (1982) suggest that whereas business count measures 
appear more suitable for research comparing diversified and non-diversified firms, they are 
less appropriate in explaining the difference among diversified firms. Hall and St. John (1994) 
show that categorical and continuous measures appear to be associated, but they seem to 
capture different aspects of the relationship between diversification and performance. Robins 
and Wiersema (2003) show that the related components of both concentric and entropy 
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measures can be sensitive to features of the corporate portfolio composition and can therefore 
create ambiguities. Due to these characteristics of these measures, it might be the case that 
those studies that have used these measures to capture a relationship between related 
diversification and performance may have actually picked up a relationship between pure 
diversification and performance (Robins & Wiersema, 2003).   
Other measurement problems are inherent in using common data sources such as 
Compustat to operationalize diversification. For instance, some of the limitations identified in 
the use of these data relate to the fact that “individual” segments may actually already 
incorporate some diversification and that, further, the number of lines of business that firms 
can indicate in their Compustat profile is restricted to ten, limiting the extent to which 
diversification can be observed (Villalonga, 2004). 
Another important issue in the measurement of the relationship between diversification 
and performance concerns the interpretation of the construct of “relatedness” itself. In fact, 
relatedness can refer to interdependencies between different businesses that can originate from 
many sources. For instance two businesses can be related in that they share common inputs 
(Ahuja, Lampert & Tandon, 2013), skills and capabilities (Farjoun, 1994; Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1977; 1982); technologies  and knowledge (e.g., Miller, 2006; 
Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999; Tanriverdi & Venkataraman, 2005); physical 
assets (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; St. John & Harrison, 1999); distribution channels or 
product markets (Capron & Hulland, 1999).  
Unfortunately, the correlations between these various sources of relatedness are far from 
perfect and likely to be variable across industries and over time. Moreover, industries are likely 
to differ in terms of which of these bases of relatedness are more meaningful in a given set of 
industries. These types of issues further complicate the interpretation of aggregate 
relationships, even nuanced ones, between diversification and performance. In some industries, 
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skill relatedness may be critical as all other resources available for conducting the business 
may be easily available; in other cases common distribution channels may be key to synergy 
benefits while products to be put through the distribution channels can be sourced very easily. 
The inability to establish a standard definition of relatedness over space and time makes 
interpreting and using a broad D-P relationship challenging.  
 
Measuring performance. We note that some studies have also emphasized that the 
measurement of performance itself can affect results. For example, Bergh (1995) shows that 
diversification is positively related to performance when data are pooled, averaged and tested 
cross-sectionally; while different association patterns are identified when relationships are 
tested over time. Whited (2001) points out that the different measures can be subject to 
measurement error and as such can generate distorted results. Whited (2001) builds on prior 
literature that identifies a diversification discount emerging from the inefficient allocation of 
capital expenditures across divisions within conglomerates. She suggests that these results may 
rather be caused by measurement error in q as well as in the correlation between investment 
opportunities and liquidity. Treating measurement error in q, the paper finds no evidence of 
inefficient allocation of investment.  
An important issue on the measurement of performance concerns what metrics are more 
appropriate to use. Accounting metrics (e.g. ROA, ROE) and stock market metrics (e.g. Tobin’s 
Q, stock market reaction to diversification moves) could both serve as measures of the 
performance effects of diversification and indeed a broad literature has developed using both 
types of measures, albeit with a difference in relative usage across fields: in finance, the focus 
is commonly on market measures, whereas strategy researchers more commonly use 
accounting measures.  
The reliance on different performance measures might lead to different conclusions on the 
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diversification-performance relationship and, in particular, regarding the benefits of related 
versus unrelated diversification. For instance, as noted earlier, the benefits of unrelated 
diversification potentially include a “co-insurance effect” that may reduce the cost of capital 
(Lewellen 1971) as well as provide stability to cash flows (Bettis & Hall, 1982). Although the 
key synergy benefits of related diversification could be reflected in accounting performance 
measures such as average ROE, some of the benefits of unrelated diversification such as 
volatility reduction may not be captured by average ROE-type metrics. In fact, solely using 
such accounting measures may unfairly bias the findings towards demonstrating better 
performance for related diversifiers in this case. In contrast, market measures that capture 
expectations can, in the context of a reasonably efficient market, represent the wisdom of 
crowds. Therefore, market measures may be able to price in the benefits of volatility reduction 
as well as traditional synergies.   
If market measures might be more comprehensive in their consideration of benefits and 
yield conclusions at odds with those reached through the accounting measures, then the 
discerning scholar might wonder if perhaps we need to look deeper at studies using purely 
accounting measures as they may suffer from the “effects- of- diversification-are-split-across-
multiple-outcome-measures problem” and should rather prefer to use market-based measures 
to study diversification. However, market-based measures suffer from their own limitations. In 
addition to the issues of capital market efficiency (limitations that attend to all research 
conducted using market-based measures) in the context of research on diversification there is 
an additional limitation: diversified firms’ stock valuations may be subject to social legitimacy 
and bounded rationality problems from the perspective of stock analysts. These may lead to a 
discounting of their stock prices relative to focused firms for cognitive rather than cash-flow 
reasons (Litov, Moreton & Zenger, 2012; Zuckerman, 1999).  
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Using a sociological lens, Zuckerman (1999) argued and found support for the idea that, 
when a firm is not covered by analysts who are experts in that firm’s business, its stock price 
tends to be discounted – a phenomenon he describes as an “illegitimacy discount”. In 
subsequent work Zuckerman (2000) argued and demonstrated that diversified firms indeed de-
diversified if their pattern of diversification precluded their fitting into a coherent corporate 
identity that matched the analysts’ expertise categories. Together these papers suggest that 
stock prices of unrelated diversifiers may be partially dampened due to lack of appropriate 
coverage by analysts. Subsequent work investigated this hypothesis further. Litov, Moreton & 
Zenger (2012) show, on the one hand, that more unique and costly-to-evaluate strategies, such 
as corporate diversification, receive less analyst coverage; on the other hand, that firms that 
receive more coverage trade at a higher premium relative to firms receiving less coverage. 
Relatedly, Feldman 2015 explores further the role that analysts and their cognitive limitations 
might be playing in providing ratings which in turn affect valuations.  
 
Confounders. One of the earliest methodological contributions to the debate on resolving 
the issue of whether related diversification is associated with superior performance was to raise 
the possibility of omitted variables (e.g. market structure, unobserved firm quality) that may 
be influencing the results. Following this logic, the argument went, the differences between 
diversifying and non-diversifying firms could be related to the characteristics of the markets 
(Chang and Thomas, 1989; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981) or the industries (Bettis, 1981; 
Bettis & Hall, 1982; Park, 2003; Scherer, 1965) in which those firms were operating, or may 
be the result of unobserved heterogeneity in firm quality that could drive both the decision on 
the level of relatedness that should be sought and the performance outcome (Bettis & Hall, 
1982) rather than superior or inferior performance being a direct effect of the diversification 
strategy pursued by the firm. 
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For instance, Christensen and Montgomery (1981) found evidence of a tendency of firms 
pursuing a related-constrained strategy to operate in high-growth and concentrated markets. At 
the same time, most unrelated diversifiers were operating in markets with low profitability, low 
concentration and low market share (which led them towards diversification).  Selecting 
samples from different industries and comparing the results, Bettis and Hall (1982) suggest that 
there might not be statistically significant performance differences between firms belonging to 
the different Rumelt’s categories if not for those relating to industry differences. Similarly, 
Grant and Jammine (1988) investigated the differences in firms’ profits and sales performance 
in a sample of large UK firms classified according to the Wrigley/Rumelt diversification 
categories. Controlling for the influence of other firms and industry differences, these studies 
identified the existence of a significant positive relationship between diversification and firm 
performance, but did not find any evidence of the superiority of related versus unrelated 
diversification. In addition to the importance of controlling for market and industry 
characteristics in the analysis, additional elements have been brought into the discussion, such 
as the issues of accounting for differences in the time and economic period of observation (e.g. 
McDougall & Round, 1984); for the level of firm leverage (Lamont & Polk, 2001) and for the 
specific accounting policies that might alter the result depending on whether diversification 
was achieved via acquisition or not (Custodio, 2014).  
 
Form of the relationship. The functional form of the relationship between diversification 
and performance has also been the subject of debate, with some studies suggesting a curvilinear 
form as the best approximation of the relationship, with diversification bringing the maximum 
performance benefits at moderate levels (e.g. Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 
1994; Markides, 1992). Palich, Cardinal & Miller (2000) systematically reviewed all the 
literature in this area and tackled this issue head-on, identifying three alternative functional 
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forms of the relationship from prior literature (i.e. linear, inverted- U and intermediate). They 
conduct a meta-analysis using data generated from more than three decades of empirical 
research in order to assess which of the three models best approximates the relationship. Their 
results provide support for the inverted-U model, when performance is measured using either 
accounting or market-based measures.  
While this study remains the most established result on the general nature of the 
relationship between performance and diversification, a few studies have explored the form of 
this relationship in different specific contexts. Matusik and Fitza (2012) suggest that in the very 
specific case in which diversification is focused on a particular class of assets (i.e. knowledge 
assets) a U-shaped relationship is found between diversification and performance, due to the 
fact that at low level of knowledge diversification firms experience the benefits of knowledge 
specialization, and at high level of knowledge diversification firms experience the benefits 
derived from the ability of solving complex problems; moderate levels of diversification, 
instead, yield the worst results. Other studies focus on the specific case of intra-industry 
diversification. Zahavi and Lavie (2013) show the existence of a U-shaped relationship 
between intra-industry product diversity and performance: the existence of negative transfer 
effects initially undermines firm performance when product diversity increases; however, 
when diversity increases still further, the resulting economies of scope lead to an increase in 
performance. The level of technological investment makes this effect even more pronounced, 
whereas the firm experience with intra-industry diversification tends to reduce it. Hashai (2015) 
suggests that the relationship between intra-industry diversification and performance might 
actually be S-shaped, due to the relationship between adjustment costs, coordination costs and 
within-industry diversification benefits. Although this study is consistent with Zahavi and 
Lavie (2013), in that performance declines at low-levels of diversification, this result contrasts 
the Zahavi and Lavie (2013) study in that it does not predict a decline at high diversification 
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levels. The author suggests that this inconsistency may be due to the characteristics of the 
measures used for intra-industry diversification in the two studies, with the Hashai study 
employing a measure that captures penetration in new product categories as opposed to 
expansion in existing categories.  
 
Direction of causality and self-selection. An important issue in interpreting the D-P 
relationship concerns the possibility that the observed relationship is a product of selection 
rather than treatment. Note that Rumelt originally had raised a version of this possibility 
suggesting a reversal of causality: poor performing firms diversify into distant industries, rather 
than that unrelated diversification leads to poor performance. The finance literature has indeed 
probed this line of reasoning at some length and argued for exploring the endogeneity of the 
decision in the first place.  
Following this logic, studies focused on the causality in the observed empirical 
relationships between diversification and discounts in market value: essentially, they focused 
not so much on challenging the existence of a diversification discount, but more on whether it 
could be causally attributed to diversification per se (Erdorf et al., 2013; Martin & Sayrak, 
2003). In this stream, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) found that participants in such 
diversification programs also had “discounts” in their last year as stand-alone firms. Consistent 
with the earlier Rumelt “escape” conjecture, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Hyland and Diltz 
(2002) found that diversifiers were poor performers prior to conglomeration. Campa and Kedia 
(2002) find a strong correlation between a firm decision to diversify and firm value. Park (2003) 
finds that related acquirers were more profitable in their industries than unrelated acquirers, 
prior to acquisition; and related acquirers were in more profitable industries than unrelated 
acquirers, prior to acquisition.  
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More recent studies look even more closely at the relationship and identify more complex 
endogenous relationships. Gomes and Livdan (2004) suggest that diversification is often the 
result of bad productivity shocks and this might explain the diversification discount. An 
alternative explanation is advanced by Levinthal and Wu (2010) who instead argue for the 
possibility that diversifying firms are high-capability firms operating in low performing market 
contexts. Firms operating in more mature markets are more likely to diversify earlier than other 
firms. This leads to total profit growth but to lower average returns due to the fact that they 
spread their non-scale free capabilities across segments.  
Consistent with this logic, Wu (2013) suggests that the higher opportunity costs faced by 
more capable firms in more mature markets leads them to diversify. In line with the idea that 
diversification is chosen by the best firms, DeFigueiredo and Rawley (2011) suggest that, when 
managers require external investment to expand, higher-skilled firms will be more likely to 
diversify.   
 
Considerations and Implications for Future Research. In Table 3 we provide a synthesis 
of the core studies reviewed in this section of the paper. More generally, the review of 
methodological issues in assessing the diversification-performance relationship suggests that 
diversification and performance can both be measured in multiple ways and the different 
measures of diversification and of performance may be only limitedly correlated.  Further, 
individual diversification measures such as an entropy index, count measure, or Herfindahl 
measure, may in fact not be closely related with the same measure calculated using a different 
dimension of diversification (e.g. relatedness in technology rather than skills or  markets . This 
suggests that the underlying micro-mechanisms by which diversification affects performance 
differ substantially across the different dimensions of diversification. Although establishing a 
single universal relationship between diversification and performance is useful for many 
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purposes, it may also be sacrificing much information and nuance; nuance that could be critical 
in providing guidance to managers.  A very useful complementary line of research to the past 
work seeking a broad relationship between diversification and performance would instead 
embrace the richness that the work on the D-P relationship has demonstrated.  Research has 
clearly established that diversification and firm performance are both inherently 
multidimensional phenomena acting upon each other through a myriad of connections. Any 
attempt to rest after establishing a stable, single relationship here may be guilty of settling for 
far less than we can truly extract from the past. Sounding a caution commonly attributed to 
Einstein, we note that “everything must be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler.” 
Hence, we should embrace the rich information embedded in these complex relationships and 
seek some other path to collate and make sense of them. This is a direction we develop later in 
the next section of this paper.   
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
Revitalizing Research on Diversification: A Mechanisms-Based Perspective 
The foregoing review above should have clarified several issues. First, most importantly, it 
should have clarified that the question “does diversification affect performance” (or, for that 
matter, the question “does related diversification imply superior performance relative to 
unrelated diversification”) is probably quite broad and aggregative. Diversification occurs in 
many different ways (e.g. inputs, markets, technology, etc.), is conducted for many, sometimes 
conflicting, reasons, and affects multiple performance measures, often in different ways. In 
other words, any consistent overarching relationship between these constructs is likely to be 
open to a serious interpretation problem, in terms of how such a relationship can be really used 
in practice- as well as face concern over its domain of applicability.   
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Second, the survey should have highlighted that the typical research setting for a 
diversification study – i.e. a broad cross-sectional sample spanning many firms in many 
industries - is likely to compound the concerns of interpretation and domain applicability. 
Given the many, often conflicting objectives that lead to diversification and the many 
mechanisms through which diversification affects performance, it is unlikely that a given 
mechanism or set of mechanisms will be pervasive across large samples. The complexity of 
the relationships identified earlier suggests that testing many of the arguments would require 
fairly nuanced research designs. Unfortunately, to expect them to hold strong in a single large 
cross-industry sample of firms may be too optimistic –something that could explain why so 
many individual studies have found conflicting results.  
Third, the review highlights that establishing causality in this relationship is tricky and 
there are strong reasons to expect that reverse causality and miscellaneous endogeneity 
problems may be rife in this setting. This draws attention to a difficulty with the fairly common 
“broad cross-section of industry” research design. As finance researchers have indicated, there 
may be reasons to worry about finding or using instruments in such a sample (Santalo’ & 
Becerra, 2008). Indeed, to the extent that endogeneity remains a concern, it is quite possible 
that an exogenous shock or other endogeneity-addressing technique that could enable a slightly 
stronger case for causality to be made may be much easier to identify and execute in a narrower, 
targeted sample.   
Finally, although it is undoubtedly useful to get an aggregative picture of the D-P 
relationship, such an understanding is highly complementary to a more fine-grained 
understanding of the individual mechanisms through which diversification benefits and costs 
play out. This is important not just for good scholarship, but also in this particular context, for 
advising and informing managers, which is part of the reason for studying the phenomenon in 
the first place. Telling a manager – “yes there is some evidence for a weak relationship between 
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related diversification and performance but we really can’t explain why” would not be very 
complete advice.  
Building on the foundational premise that the essence of diversification is that of 
conducting multiple activities (underlying multiple business) within the boundaries of the same 
corporation and that the interdependence between these activities explains the performance 
effect of diversification (Levinthal, 1997; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; 1995), we suggest that 
complementary approach to the study of diversification would be based on an understanding 
of different types of synergies or anti-synergies that emerge when bundling together different 
types of activities or products. These synergies and anti-synergies are what we call “micro-
mechanisms”. These micro-mechanisms are really at the source of the relationship, and to claim 
a true causal effect it would be important to identify the micro-mechanisms at work and show 
them leading to a specific performance effect. This suggests that uncovering and focusing on 
the key mechanisms linking firm scope to performance would be a key starting point for a new 
approach, and it is to this task that we now turn. 
 
Identifying The Micro-Mechanisms Underlying The Diversification-Performance Relationship 
To support the advancement of a micro-mechanisms approach to the study of diversification 
we use our comprehensive review of prior studies to identify the mechanisms at play in the 
context of diversification. In order to do so a) we begin by examining the different theoretical 
perspectives that existing research has employed in order to explain why diversification occurs 
in the first place, providing theoretical foundations to the study of this phenomenon; b) 
thereafter, we draw on these perspectives and identify from prior research the mechanisms at 
play in the context of each theoretical motivation for diversification  c) finally, we outline the 
core principles of a micro-mechanisms based approach to the study of the D-P relationship. 
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Theoretical Perspectives Explaining Why Diversification Occurs 
We identify the core perspectives presented in the literature and organize them into broad 
categories. In the first category we locate theories that have made the case that diversification 
can be a value enhancing decision for corporations and have focused on identifying the broad 
economic logic of the value created. These perspectives are also the basis for our subsequent 
section that looks at the precise mechanisms through which diversification provides synergies 
(i.e. adds value) and also the ways in which diversification creates anti-synergies (i.e. 
introduces new costs). These perspectives include the resource-based view, transaction cost 
economics, what we label as strategic behavior and financial theories of risk-reduction and 
information efficiency. However, in addition to these synergy-seeking perspectives the 
literature has also identified other motivations for diversification.  Although these other 
motivations do not necessarily help us to understand the mechanisms underlying synergies, for 
completeness we list them in this review as well, in part to highlight that the motivations for 
diversification can be quite diverse in themselves.  
In the second category we place theories that are (potentially) consistent with shareholder-
value maximization, but focus on the uncertainty and bounded rationality that corporate 
decision-makers face. In this group we included evolutionary economics, organizational 
learning and institutional theories of diversification. These theories can be interpreted as 
viewing diversification as a mechanism through which managers learn about the environment, 
expand their cognitive capabilities, and seek legitimacy through conformity with their peers in 
an uncertain environment. In the last group we focus on explanations of diversification that are 
largely inconsistent with shareholder value maximization. In this group we list agency theory, 
which argues that diversification may be related to enhancing utility for managers. These last 
four theoretical perspectives do not appear to draw upon the notion of synergy to explain 
diversification as we will note in the brief synopses ahead.  
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Theoretical perspectives underlying shareholder-value-maximizing, synergy-seeking 
diversification. We start by reviewing theoretical perspectives that see diversification as a 
value-enhancing strategy.  
 
Diversification and the resource-based view of the firm. The issue of corporate strategy 
and diversification has historically been the object of research within the resource-based view 
tradition beginning with Penrose’s (1959) work on firms’ growth and Chandler’s (1962) work 
on strategy and structure as well as studies on the core competence of the corporation (Hamel 
& Prahalad, 1990). Within the resource-based view of the firm, the resources held in the 
corporate portfolio determine the scope and the direction of the firm diversification move 
(Penrose, 1959). This is due to the fact that resources are mainly acquired in ‘bundles’ and part 
of those resources remains unused (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1989). Firms are 
incentivized to diversify in order to use their excess capacity of resources that have multiple 
uses but that are subject to market failure (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
In this respect, the resource-based view provides a theoretical basis for the existence of a 
performance effect of diversification. The competitive advantage of diversifying firms 
originates from the fact that they can be getting access to resources at a “price” that is lower 
than the market price, they can enjoy economies of scope. As a result firms have an incentive 
to expand into other domains if expansion can provide a way of using the unused capacity 
(Penrose, 1959). In addition, diversified firms have the opportunity to accumulate strategic 
assets - not otherwise available through the market - more rapidly and at lower costs than 
competitors (Markides & Williamson, 1994; 1996).  
43 
 
It follows that the benefits generated by diversification depend on the extent to which 
resources can be shared across businesses, i.e. on their fungibility. This mechanism provides 
the basis to theorize a possible superiority of related diversification over unrelated 
diversification, due to the fact that when the distance between businesses increases, not only 
does the value of the resources decrease, but also their firm-specificity, reducing the advantage 
of diversification (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Wernerfelt & 
Montgomery, 1988). In addition, the characteristics of the demand environment also have a 
role in determining firm’s profitability in that they influence the opportunity costs associated 
with the use of firms’ resources in certain domains rather than others (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; 
Wu, 2013).   
 
Diversification and transaction costs economics. Following transaction costs theory, 
firms’ decisions to diversify into other businesses - either vertically related or horizontally 
related – might be driven by the opportunity that internalization could offer to reduce the 
transactions costs of market exchange (Jones & Hill, 1988). For instance, moral hazard and 
information asymmetries between interacting businesses may be reduced as a result of 
diversification.   
Diversification potentially reduces the costs of transactions through various mechanisms.  
First, internalization reduces the need to write complex contracts between the various parts of 
the business (Arrow, 1974) and enables a business to invest in relationship-specific assets, 
resulting in lower costs for the production of goods and services (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 
1978) even if there is an imperfect market for those goods or services. It also allows for the 
realization of economies of scope that—despite the fact that they could in principle happen 
also in the open market—are made difficult by the presence of bounded rationality, 
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opportunism, and information impactedness (Argyres, 1996; Kay, 1982; 1984; Jones & Hill, 
1988).  
From a performance implication perspective, transaction cost-induced diversification 
could improve performance, but only if there is discriminating alignment involved (i.e. the 
underlying transactions are subject to high asset specificity and uncertainty and hence 
integration is the appropriate solution). However, such conditions are unlikely to be widespread 
across all industries: as different samples might be associated with differing degrees of asset 
specificity and uncertainty, one might not be surprised to find effects in different directions if 
this were the only argument driving diversification (see Santalo’ & Becerra, 2008). 
 
Diversification and strategic behavior. Strategic behavior theories suggest that 
diversification is beneficial in part because a firm’s simultaneous presence in multiple markets 
provides competition-related advantages due to the possibility of coordinating strategies across 
these markets. First, diversification can lead to multi-market contact between firms (Edwards, 
1955) enabling coordination with the firm’s competitors and the achievement of mutual 
forbearance and reduced competition (Baum & Greve, 2001, Baum & Korn, 1999; Li & 
Greenwood, 2004). Second, firms with multiple businesses and cash-flow streams may use 
cash generated through one business to cross-subsidize another business, thus giving the second 
business an advantage in its market (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Meyer, Milgrom, & Roberts, 1992; 
Scherer, 1980). Third, firms may enter a vertically related (upstream or downstream) business 
and limit the access of their competitors to suppliers or buyers, i.e. foreclosure (Hart & Tirole, 
1990). Note that while we classify these types of moves as strategic behavior and value-
enhancing an important caveat to the value-enhancing part is that these motives for 
diversification can also be illegal for antitrust reasons. For instance, diversification conducted 
purely for either foreclosure or to create multi-market forbearance will likely be ruled illegal.  
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From a research perspective it follows that strategic-behavior-motivated diversification’s 
effect on firm performance is contingent on the characteristics of the firm’s environment, most 
importantly the degree of market power enjoyed by the firm and its buyers and suppliers in 
various businesses. This suggests that research designs that try to capture strategic behavior 
mechanisms as controls or as main hypothesized effects, need to be tailored quite precisely. 
The first of these three effects (i.e. multi-market contact) requires close study of competitors 
contemporaneously meeting in multiple sub-markets; the second (i.e. cross-subsidizing) 
requires a longitudinal analysis of competition between incumbents and entrants; and the third 
(i.e. foreclosure) requires an analysis of vertical power between buyers and suppliers in 
individual segments.  It is unlikely that any single sample will accurately reflect all these 
required characteristics. 
 
Diversification and financial theories of risk-reduction and information efficiency. From 
a financial-theory perspective diversification can be motivated by risk reduction, tax savings 
or information economies. The risk-reduction benefit of diversification would arise if the 
corporation, through its own ability to diversify, could reduce some risk that the shareholder 
could either not diversify away on their own or could not diversify away as cheaply. For 
instance, if capital markets were inefficient and did not permit adequate diversification 
opportunities, and the corporation could diversify, that would be beneficial to the shareholder. 
Such opportunities could arise for instance if private assets were a significant part of the 
economy and these were unavailable to the shareholder on their own or if the capital market 
was inefficient or frozen for some reason. Diversification could also enable present value 
benefits on taxes paid by facilitating tax write-offs to be taken earlier (Hayn 1989; Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). Firms with losses in some businesses can write those off against profits in other 
businesses within the same time period, provided they do have businesses that are making 
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profits. If they were not diversified, the losses would have to be carried forward. Hence, the 
timing of the tax savings can be brought forward, leading to a saving in present value terms. 
Information benefits of diversification would arise if the firm management could evaluate 
business opportunities more effectively than the market because information can be more freely 
shared within the corporation than across markets, leading to superior resource allocation 
(Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1975). This is the internal capital markets rationale for 
diversification.   
 
Theoretical perspectives underlying (potentially) shareholder-value-maximizing, non- 
synergy-seeking diversification. As noted earlier, there are also non-synergy seeking 
explanations for diversification. Although they do not directly provide inputs for how managers 
could improve diversification outcomes, for completeness we review them here as well.   
 
Diversification and organizational learning/evolutionary theory. Within organizational 
learning theory, diversification is one mechanism through which firms aim to overcome the 
limits to their corporate cognition. Diversification represents a mechanism for organizational 
learning, through which firms develop knowledge in areas in which they are not familiar 
(Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Normann, 1971, 1977). Diversification and the industry entry and 
exit activities it involves can also serve as a process of search and selection conducted by the 
firm to improve its fit with the environment (Chang, 1996; Galbraith, 1982; Roberts, 1978). 
Further, the effectiveness of diversification is contingent on the strategic fit between the 
learning requirements of the firm and the structural and procedural arrangements made by the 
firm to achieve the intended result (e.g. Argyres, 1996; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Kim, et al., 
2013).  An implication of this perspective is that, if diversification is carried out for learning 
reasons through sequential entry and exit, then the best research design to capture it (consistent 
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with the point made in the previous paragraph) would not be a cross-sectional multi-industry 
study but a much more focused longitudinal study.    
 
Diversification and institutional theory. Seen through an institutional theory lens, 
diversification occurs as a result of mimetic isomorphism, as organizations tend to follow 
similar and successful organizations into new markets (e.g. Haveman, 1993; Fligstein, 1991). 
The benefits of following such an isomorphic approach come in several forms. First, by 
imitating the actions of other organizations, a focal firm economizes on search costs while 
addressing uncertainty (Haveman, 1993). Second, firms acquire legitimacy by adopting 
courses of action that are “institutionalized”, i.e. followed by other social actors in the market 
(Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley, 1994). This theoretical lens has been used to justify the empirical 
tendency towards refocusing that firms have followed in the early and mid-1980s. Because 
firms require legitimacy from financial market participants, they may feel pressured toward 
refocusing by these actors (Zuckerman, 1999; 2000).  
This logic implicitly suggests that isomorphic diversification will tend to materialize if the 
environment is characterized by higher uncertainty and complexity. In these kinds of contexts, 
other firms’ actions, and the assessment that these actions receive, can take the role of signals, 
which help reducing and navigating the inherent ambiguity that characterizes the environment. 
In less complex contexts or better-understood contexts (such as mature industries, for 
example), these kind of signals are likely to play a less salient role in corporate action.  Note 
also that the institutional theory rationale for diversification does not actually suggest any 
strong or direct impact on performance. If imitation is appropriate, firms will do well from 
diversifying for isomorphism reasons; if not, they may not.  In other words to the extent that 
some diversification is driven by isomorphism, in a diversification-performance investigation, 
it may indicate no relationship between diversification and performance.  
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Theoretical perspectives underlying non-shareholder-value-maximizing diversification. 
Finally, diversification has also been studied by scholars relaxing the assumption that 
diversification is a shareholder-value-maximizing strategy. 
Diversification and agency theory. Managers’ decision to engage in diversification has 
also been heavily investigated by scholars using an agency theory perspective. Agency theory 
suggests that utility maximizing agents make decisions that are not necessarily aligned with 
the interests of the principal. Diversification occurs because managers – not being full residual 
claimants – make decisions that maximize their own utility rather than the firm’s utility.  
Diversification can increase managers’ utility via two commonly argued mechanisms 
(Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003). First, managers with high equity ownership or high firm-
specific human capital derive utility from diversification and the attendant reduction of the 
idiosyncratic risks that they personally face, despite the fact that stockholders could diversify 
on their own – at least to some extent- in capital markets (Amihud & Lev, 1999; May, 1995). 
Second, managers diversify because they derive private benefits from it (Jensen 1986; Stulz, 
1990), which come in the form of higher prestige, power, or better career prospects (e.g. Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  
Building on some earlier evidence that diversification is negatively related to managerial 
equity ownership (e.g. Amihud & Lev, 1999; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997; May, 1995) a lively 
debate has played out in this area on whether the act of monitoring by a firm’s principal 
influences a firm’s diversification strategy (e.g. Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998; Amihud & 
Lev, 1999; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1999; Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1999). 
Although managerial-agency-driven diversification does not necessarily seek synergy, the 
implications of managerial- agency- driven diversification for firm performance are not 
necessarily straightforward.  Some of the common mechanisms through which managerial 
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agency hurts firms are open to conflicting interpretations.  For instance, it has been argued that 
managers may over-diversify to reduce their own employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1999).  
However, other work raises issues about whether this is really value-destructive. First, to the 
extent that diversification is good for firms (cf. the diversification premium mentioned earlier), 
even though the primary goal of unrelated diversification was to benefit managers, it is unclear 
that this would necessarily hurt firms. Indeed, researchers have made the argument that such 
diversification may reduce earnings volatility and hence enable less noisy measurement of 
manager performance, and also may reduce managers perceived risk and expected return from 
employment (Marshall, Yawitz & Greenberg, 1984).     
Alternately, managers may choose to diversify in ways that further entrench them for 
instance by entering businesses where their skills are particularly valuable to the company 
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1989). Again, it is not clear that this necessarily destroys value. Firms 
often face many alternative growth paths and a priori it is often not clear that a given path is 
better than others (Chang, 1996). In such circumstances managers will make calls; and their 
own expertise is not always a bad basis on which to make a decision.  More generally, the 
diversification of the manager’s own risk, as well as the maximization of their utility, is not 
necessarily in conflict with the maximization of the firm’s performance. For instance, it could 
be argued that – given the temporary nature of the manager’s association with the company- 
agents might privilege short-term-ism; however in this event too there is no performance 
penalty to the firm when the maximization of short-term returns is the best strategy given the 
context in which the firm is operating. For example, this could be dependent on the lifecycle 
of the firm or the industry in which the firm is operating or on the economic cycle.  
Of course, it is quite probable that managers could and do make choices that maximize 
their private benefits even though these choices may not be in the interest of the firm (thus 
diminishing firm value).  The broader point we make here is that, given these multiple 
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conflicting mechanisms at work, finding reliable and statistically-significant effects across 
varied, large samples is likely to be difficult; further such results once found may also be 
difficult to interpret in a more granular fashion given the variety of motivations at work.  From 
a research design perspective we note that broad samples of companies may aggregate too 
many of these conflicted effects to present a statistically visible and meaningful tendency, and 
therefore the ideal research design to capture these mechanisms may be narrowly focused and, 
indeed ideally, specific to the individual mechanism that is being posited.  
 
We provide a synthesis of the core theoretical perspectives addressing the phenomenon, 
the core assumptions underlying them and the core mechanisms of value creation determining 
the choice in Table 4. Unlike the previous tables, this table is organized by research 
perspectives rather than by studies for the sake of avoiding duplication.  
Uncovering the theoretical bases of why diversification occurs has certainly contributed 
substantially in advancing research on the diversification-performance relationship. Its most 
notable contribution is in the fact that it has started the task of unpacking the diversification-
performance linkages into its building blocks, i.e. mapping the mechanisms linking firm’s 
choices to diversify to the observation of specific benefits that could potentially lead to a 
superior performance.  
However, this research is also useful in a broader sense. The sheer variety of the reasons 
that cause firms to undertake diversification and the potentially conflicting effects of some of 
these mechanisms that have been unveiled by this research lead us to conclude that large, cross-
sectional multi-industry samples may be a difficult terrain within which to find significant 
effects, explaining the conflict in prior studies. We suggest that an alternative approach would 
be to use these basic motivations underlying diversification listed above to identify and 
organize the main sources and micro-mechanisms that underlie the benefits and costs created 
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through diversification.  The last column of Table 4 connects these theoretical motivations to 
the main forms of benefits (synergies) and costs (anti-synergies) that emerge as these 
motivations are played out through actual diversification.    
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
 
The Mechanisms Underlying the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
We note that the core micro-mechanisms underlying the diversification-performance 
relationship have been uncovered by past research but have not been emphasized as much as 
they should be. Specifically, we identify four types of synergies discussed or implied in existing 
research that emerge by bundling together different businesses and their underlying activities: 
horizontal and vertical operating synergies, strategic synergies, and financial synergies. We 
build this typology drawing upon the various studies mentioned earlier but also the key text 
books in the field (Barney 1997; Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; Zenger, 2016).  
We begin by noting that the main theoretical perspectives that explain why firms pursue 
synergy-seeking diversification provide a natural source for identifying these different types of 
synergies. The resource-based view arguments suggest that sharing resources across 
operational activities for different product lines can provide synergies – we call these horizontal 
operating synergies. The transaction costs economics approach suggests that - under specific 
transactional conditions - buyers or suppliers can obtain market power over the focal firm: 
neutralizing this power through vertical integration can be a source of synergies, which we call 
vertical operating synergies.  The strategic behavior of companies, wherein they attempt to 
reduce competition in their own markets (e.g. through multimarket forbearance), enhance their 
own position in a market using revenues from other markets they operate in (i.e. cross-
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subsidization of products) or increase their market power versus their suppliers and buyers (e.g. 
through foreclosure), leads to the uncovering of strategic synergies. Finally, using financial 
theories of diversification suggests the possibility of financial synergies such as risk reduction 
and tax benefits. Within each of these broad mechanisms, we in turn identify several distinct 
sub-mechanisms that have been mentioned in the literature. 
 
Synergies. The first type of synergies, i.e. horizontal operating synergies, emerges as 
benefits from sharing assets and activities across businesses. These synergies can emerge both 
on the cost and on the demand side. On the cost side, horizontal operating synergies occur 
through economies of scale and scope originating from the sharing of common core resources 
or activities across businesses that do not transact with each other. For example, P&G’s 
ownership of both shampoo and shaving blade businesses might lead to cost reduction due to 
the sharing of distribution channels. On the demand side, they can occur through brand 
spillovers or perceived higher performance for customers and thus willingness to pay 
complementarities. For example, a firm’s brand in one line of business may be extended into a 
related market because the same customers buy both products and would recognize and accord 
a product goodwill because they were familiar with the brand or because buying multiple 
products from the same provider leads to convenience (e.g. Bettis, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Grant & Jammine, 1988; Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; Rumelt, 1974; 1982; Wrigley, 1970; 
Zenger, 2016). 
Vertical operating synergies arise when conducting the activities from successive stages 
of a value chain (upstream and downstream) within the same company reduces costs or 
improves the quality of the ultimate product. Vertical benefits arise through better coordination 
between stages of production and countering the opportunism of buyers or suppliers (e.g. 
Arrow, 1974; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1975).  
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A third type of synergies, strategic synergies, arises because simultaneous presence in 
multiple markets provides competition-related or strategic behavior benefits as described 
earlier. Multi-market forbearance and cross-subsidization benefits were mentioned earlier. 
Strategic synergies could also emerge due to increase in market power that originates from 
increase in size and reputation associated with diversification  (e.g. Amit & Livnat, 1988; Li & 
Greenwood, 2004; Meyer, Milgrom, & Roberts, 1992; Scherer, 1980).  
Finally, financial synergies arise from the co-location of two businesses and their 
correspondent cash flows and decision-making activities within the same legal enterprise. 
These synergies take multiple forms. For example, they can take the form of risk-reduction. If 
the cash flows of the individual businesses in which the firm is present are negatively 
correlated, the firm can realize “safer” cash flows and can face a decreased bankruptcy risk 
(Lewellen, 1971) as well as obtain taxation benefits. An additional benefit is internal capital 
market efficiency, meaning a diversified firm could be run as an internal capital market. 
Headquarters have the ability to access the accounts of the individual businesses and can 
therefore be more efficient in its deployment of capital than entities that are outside the 
corporation and do not enjoy such preferential access to the accounts of the businesses (e.g. 
Amit & Livnat, 1988; Lewellen, 1971; Scott, 1977; Williamson, 1975). A synthesis of the main 
types of synergies and of the micro-mechanisms they entail is reported in Table 5a. 
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5a HERE 
---------------------------------- 
Anti-synergies. In parallel to the generation of synergies, managing different business 
within the same corporation might also originate substantial costs or anti-synergies (e.g. 
Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; Zenger, 2016). Although this aspect has not been studied as 
extensively by existing research, we identify nine distinct types of costs attending 
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diversification. Table 5b provides a synthesis of the main types of anti-synergies identified and 
the core illustrative studies that refer to them.  
First, we consider coordination costs, which arise from the coordination required to share 
resources across businesses. Coordination costs relate to the complexity of organizing the use 
of resources among multiple actors/units and the increase in communication and decision 
activities required to do so (e.g. Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Jones & Hill, 1988; Rawley 2010; 
Zhou, 2011). Second, we consider the opportunity costs of the resources. These are costs 
related to the fact that, at any point in time, resources need to be allocated among alternative, 
competing, activities: choices made regarding the use of a resource might imply the costs of a 
better foregone opportunity (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Penrose, 1959; 
Teece, 1982). The most common locus of such opportunity costs is managerial attention and 
focus.  
Third, administrative costs or bureaucratic costs are the costs that emerge due to the 
inefficiencies that increase in organizational size and complexity, which tend to cause loss of 
scale, increased operating leverage, loss of efficiency due to captive customers/suppliers, and 
limits to exploration (e.g. Jones & Hill, 1988; Sutherland, 1980;Williamson, 1975).  
Fourth, adaptation costs (also referred to as organizational rigidity costs or adjustment 
costs in prior research) are the costs of adapting the resources, routines and practices that are 
currently employed in existing businesses to new ones (e.g. Leonard- Barton, 1992; Kaplan & 
Henderson, 2005; Rawley, 2010) 
Fifth, learning and absorptive capacity costs refer to the costs of understanding and 
learning in new contexts (e.g. Penrose, 1959) 
Sixth, compromise costs are the costs related to the lower performance obtained in a 
specific use of a resource due to the simultaneous attempt to maximize its joint performance 
across all uses. These costs for instance could emerge due to the fact that a firm might choose 
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to develop or acquire more generic inputs or assets with the purpose of increasing their usability 
across applications, and this might lead to an undercutting of its value addition in any specific 
usage. Such costs may also emerge from the overestimation of similarities between businesses 
and the potential of the firm to benefit by sharing resources between them (e.g. Hill & 
Hoskisson, 1987; Markides & Williamson 1994; Porter, 1980). 
Seventh, contagion costs originate when declines in the value of a resource imply declines 
in the value of the same resources for other product categories as well (e.g. Greenwood et al. 
2005). For example, the decline in the value of a brand that might emerge as the result of an 
accident in a corporate facility may imply declines in the value of that brand for other product 
categories as well.  
Eighth, conflict costs relate to the non-optimization of the investment decisions and to the 
inefficient allocation of capital among different units due to the internal power struggles 
generated by diversification as well as agency and influence behavior (Hoskisson & Hitt 1988; 
Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kumar, 2013;Meyer, Milgrom, & Roberts, 1992; 
Rajan, Servaes, Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000; Stulz, 1990).  
Finally, a ninth source of costs that may be related to diversification are information and 
control costs, i.e. the information inefficiencies that are experienced when the increasing 
difference across businesses leads to limitations in information processing and in setting up 
dedicated control mechanisms (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995). Table 5b includes a complete list 
of studies identified in our review that refer to these types of costs.  
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5b HERE 
---------------------------------- 
Outlining the Essence of a Mechanisms-based Perspective to Studying Diversification 
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Our recommendation for a fine-grained, mechanism-based approach to the study of 
diversification consists of three parts. First, we argue that the essence of using the 
diversification-performance relationship to advise managers on specific trade-offs is through 
the identification of the underlying mechanisms through which the influence works; hence, it 
makes sense to focus the analysis on the basic micro-mechanisms that connect a given form of 
diversification to a given type of performance. These micro-mechanisms are the actual or 
implied synergies and, very importantly, the anti-synergies or costs arising from bringing two 
businesses together. These were just identified in the previous section. 
The second key issue to consider is that the approach advanced in this paper would suggest 
that one would not necessarily look to directly measure market value or other accounting or 
financial measures of firm performance. Instead, one might consider the actual mechanism 
being evaluated, look for proximate outcomes closely connected with that mechanism, and seek 
to evaluate the effect of changes in firm scope on that outcome. For instance, a researcher 
investigating a multimarket competition strategic benefit may choose to examine price stability 
or histories of price changes in the relevant product categories rather than net return on assets 
or another distant performance measure. Similarly, asset-sharing diversification could be 
evaluated through capacity-utilization metrics; diversification engaged in to improve the 
customer’s use experience by providing higher quality complements may be better evaluated 
by looking at increases in market share, and so on. Reducing the distance between cause and 
effect is particularly important in the context of the hyper-complex set of influences that 
emerge in a diversification setting.  
Third, we argue that large, multiple industry spanning, samples may not be ideal to really 
understand the mechanisms at work here.  As our earlier review indicates, the mechanisms are 
often nuanced, and different rationales for diversification occasionally conflict with each other. 
In a large cross-industry sample, it is very likely that multiple motivations and mechanisms are 
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at work, so any final effect would be a mix of multiple effects. Therefore, we advocate an 
alternative to simply collecting diversification metrics on a large sample of firms and regressing 
them against some measure of performance. Our approach suggests that scholars may have to 
first identify a particular mechanism through which diversification benefits a relevant 
dimension of firm performance and then identify a sample of firms at risk of engaging in such 
diversification, constructing treatment and control groups to isolate the effect of the studied 
diversification synergy. This approach also draws attention to and can potentially account for 
another common problem surfaced by the review: the selection versus treatment debate. Do 
bad firms diversify or does diversification lead to good or bad performance? Indeed, as we note 
below, a good research design made possible once we step away from a large cross-industry 
sample may enable us to handle many other causal inference concerns as well.  The point is 
that in this approach, identifying the appropriate context and obtaining a “precision” sample is 
likely to be the most time consuming part of the research design. 
Such samples could be pairs of related industries (e.g. taxis and limousines as in Rawley 
& Simcoe, 2010; home building and home financing as in Gartenberg, 2014), broader samples 
(e.g. Feldman, 2014) or related industries (e.g. Gartenberg, 2014) facing a common shock.  
Given the three features of our new approach, the typical research study in this setting would 
focus on a given type of micro-mechanism.  Rather than argue that “relatedness” in general is 
good or bad, research would focus on identifying the conditions under which a micro-
mechanism yielded benefits and the costs associated with targeting that micro-mechanism.  
To provide an illustration of recent studies in that vein, consider Zhou (2011) who looks 
at a specific type of micro-mechanism, input sharing, and highlights that while product lines 
can enjoy synergies through input sharing, such activity is also associated with significant 
coordination costs. For firms that already have complex existing businesses, such synergies 
may not be worth realizing.  In her research she targets a very specific form of synergy and 
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anti-synergy and then identifies a research design that is targeted to enable testing of this idea.  
Another study of this type is Rawley and Simcoe’s (2010) analysis of taxi-cabs and limousines 
where they focus on and identify key diseconomies of scope that arise as firms, in their case, 
increase vertical scope. Building on Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), they assume that 
vertical disintegration occurs as a result of the fact that companies outsource when the costs of 
integration exceed the costs of using the market. In order to test their theory, the authors identify 
an industry, i.e. the taxicab industry, where deregulation in the 1990s led to a wave of 
diversification and where they can observe variation in vertical integration. A pre-deregulation 
variation in local markets serves as an instrument for post-deregulation incentive to diversify. 
This research design allows them to show that diversification into new businesses (i.e. the 
limousine business) leads firms to increase their level of outsourcing, by shifting the 
composition of their fleets toward owner-operator drivers. 
Another example in this context is Gartenberg’s study on the mortgage industry (2014), 
which focuses on understanding how the boundaries of firms affect their ability to adapt to 
changing external conditions. She suggests that the constraints imposed on more diversified 
firms by the presence of an internal capital market might affect their ability to adapt to change. 
In line with the specific mechanism that she aims to investigate, she identifies the mortgage 
industry in the 2000s as a potential industry in which this effect could be observed and builds 
an appropriate research design. 
What is particularly notable in these studies is the targeting of a precise form of synergy 
or anti-synergy rather than a broad-based search for superiority of relatedness or otherwise. We 
expect that over time, as research builds understanding of synergies and their associated costs, 
it may even be possible to develop decision-aids that could be useful for managers in order to 
assess which types of complementarities are likely to matter most for a planned diversification 
move and what costs are likely to be associated with them.  
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Note of course that in this kind of micro-mechanism-driven research agenda there is no 
overarching relationship being sought or found. Rather, every study is uncovering either a 
micro-mechanism or a contingency that affects this micro-mechanism.  What would be helpful 
is a broad organizing framework that can help us house all the individual findings that this 
approach generates. The nascent theory of complementarities (Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1995) can provide such a broad super-structure for organizing this 
research. Definitionally speaking, a complementarity occurs between two activities when the 
marginal value of each activity is enhanced in the presence of the other. We note that a 
combination of firm activities or products can generate synergies and costs or anti-synergies. 
A given diversification move is meaningful if the specific synergies generated are greater than 
the costs generated by the combination.  
In its essence a mechanisms-based theory of diversification would argue that rather than 
looking for broad tendencies of “related businesses” to outperform unrelated ones or diversified 
firms to outperform focused ones, we should instead consider whether pairs or sets of activities 
or products that firms seek to combine when they diversify are mutually super-additive in 
value. If a diversification move, i.e. combining two products, businesses, or activities, is super-
additive in value, only then should the scope expansion be undertaken. Value super-additivity 
between two activities and products could occur, for instance, through super-additivity in 
willingness to pay (i.e. consumption synergies) or sub-additivity in costs (i.e. production 
synergies) or some combination thereof. 
 
The implications for future research of a mechanism-based approach  
Given these various synergies and anti-synergies involved in diversification, one could now 
ask many different types of questions in different samples and settings. We suggest that using 
this approach to investigate the performance implications of diversification would have a 
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substantial impact on future research by leading to the uncovering of nuances of the problem 
that cannot be appreciated if diversification is treated in an aggregative fashion. For instance, 
the micro-mechanisms underlying a diversification move do not necessarily correlate and may 
even conflict with each other, leading to unclear predictions. As an example, one can think 
about the fact that horizontal operating synergies include the sub-mechanisms of brand and 
reputation spillovers as well as scope economies through sharing of inputs across businesses: 
a given diversification move could trigger conflicting effects in these two mechanisms, 
decreasing costs through sharing inputs but also destroying distinctiveness and willingness to 
pay and thus hurting brand value (see Table 5a).  
Most of the existing studies do not account for the precise mechanisms of value-addition 
at play, and even when they do, they do not systematically explore or measure the costs of 
realizing the synergy or assess the extent to which these costs offset the benefits deriving from 
diversification. In our analysis we suggest that approaching the problem in this fashion would 
lead to insightful results. For instance, we note that the relative incidence of these costs differs 
across the different types of synergies (note how not all forms of synergies are subject to all 
forms of costs in Table 5b), raising the possibility that certain types of synergies that have been 
argued to provide relatively little benefit (e.g. financial synergies) relative to other forms of 
synergy (e.g. operating synergies) may yet fare no worse in their final effect on performance 
because they may also entail significantly lower costs. Indeed, as noted earlier, more recent 
findings in the finance literature have found evidence of a diversification premium, a possibility 
not inconsistent with the previous observation. 
 
Why Now: New phenomena, New Theories, New Research Methods, New Data 
We believe there are several reasons why this approach is particularly relevant at the present 
time. Specifically, we believe there are several sources of new energy in the area that were not 
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present earlier, i.e. factors that were not significant or available between 1980 and 1995 – the 
period when the diversification literature developed most significantly. We see four potential 
sources of new energy for work on diversification that we hope will be catalysts for future 
research in the area.  
First, we note the preponderance of relatively new ways in which diversification is 
occurring today (i.e. phenomenological catalysts), resulting in visible and observable 
challenges to our understanding of diversification. For example, the widespread use of 
information and communication technologies has substantially increased connectivity and 
reduced coordination costs for firms and for individuals. For instance, companies like Google 
and Microsoft have expanded into many different markets where on the surface there seem to 
be relatively limited classical synergies. Companies like Uber are increasingly fashioning 
themselves as platforms, considering expansion into many markets. What are the boundaries 
to such scope expansion is currently not very clear. Similarly, globalization increasingly pits 
companies from emerging markets that come from business groups against relatively focused 
Western competitors providing us with an opportunity to study the diversification performance 
relationship more deeply and from new perspectives.   
Second, we believe there are new theoretical catalysts, such as the developments in the 
literatures on complementarity and choice interdependencies, as well as the related analytic 
techniques that are providing a very significant way to both house the findings on 
diversification and synergies in a cohesive superstructure and probe the implications of 
diversification (e.g. Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008; Levinthal, 1997; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1990;1995; Porter, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002). These new developments in 
the analytic techniques that have emerged in the last decade to study complementarities also 
provide great potential for understanding diversification at the activity level – a level that has 
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not commonly been used but which is most meaningful if understanding and documenting 
synergies is a key goal of this research stream.  
Third, diversification research has historically been bedeviled by endogeneity problems, 
as discussed in the earlier sections of this review. Addressing these endogeneity issues has been 
tricky. However, new methodological catalysts, i.e. recent advances in addressing endogeneity, 
offer the opportunity to gather novel insights on the problem. A variety of focused techniques 
have emerged ranging from propensity score analysis, regression discontinuity designs, 
matched control samples created through exogenous shocks etc. Note that for many of these 
analytic approaches it may be easier to develop a clean research design focusing on a narrower 
precision sample than to do a multi-industry broad sample.  
Fourth, we see new measurement and empirical catalysts. The increasing use of 
technology, particularly the dramatic increase in online commercial interactions over the last 
decades (think about global marketplaces such Amazon that serve as a platform for other sellers 
to sell their products), has generated a substantial amount of new data (see for instance 
Oestreicher-Singer & Sundararajan, 2012; Stephen & Toubia, 2010; Zhu & Liu, 2014). This 
new data may potentially be used to measure the diversification of firms’ product scope and 
may also be connected to other relevant information such as customers’ product consumption 
choices and behavior. Although existing research on diversification has not fully adopted this 
approach yet, several recent studies that have started moving in this direction.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
In this paper we have sounded a call for a new approach to the study of diversification.  In 
sounding this call we are saying that the old approaches have served us well and established 
the dimensions of the phenomenon and its antecedents and consequences in many different 
ways.  We now seek to re-characterize the problem in a fundamental way.  Rather than simply 
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seek an answer to the D-P relationship puzzle in aggregate, we suggest a complementary path 
might be that of developing an understanding of the multiple, potential, synergies and anti-
synergies that emerge from bringing together two sets of products or activities. To jumpstart 
this activity we catalogued some of the key synergies and anti-synergies already identified in 
prior research and articulated the key changes that the new paradigm of research would entail 
– i.e. focusing on specific micro-mechanisms underlying diversification, targeting an outcome 
that is proximate to the mechanism under investigation and seeking a precision sample where 
it might be found, all the while considering the possibility of both synergies and anti-synergies 
associated with the micro-mechanism.  
The goal is that, over time, research will identify and established a full library of benefits 
and costs that can accompany a change in firm scope.  Such a library could then be the basis 
of decision aids and tools to guide managers to create value-enhancing changes in firm 
boundaries. We also noted that this entire library could itself be the source of further research 
as scholars could look to understand relationships between types of synergies (e.g. under what 
conditions should production synergies be weighted more heavily than consumption synergies? 
Under what conditions do financial synergies make up for organizational attention costs in the 
context of diversifying into an unrelated business? Under what conditions do brand spillovers 
have a greater potential to be beneficial or harmful?).  
More generally, we expect that such a research agenda will generate understanding about 
different types of synergies and anti-synergies. Following Simon (1962), we could, over time, 
organize these synergies into a hierarchy. For instance, one could argue that, over the course 
of the twentieth century, production or cost-side synergies were the common rationale for scope 
expansion. Classic illustrations of this were companies like Ford that were highly vertically 
integrated or General Motors, which built many different types of vehicles. In the twenty-first 
century, consumption synergies have increasingly become more important in affecting firm 
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scope. Consider Amazon, which has expanded from selling books, into all manner of products 
and is increasingly expanding into electronic devices, such as the Kindle, which share little 
with its core “production” skills but are critical from the perspective of consumption 
complementarity.  This would suggest that production synergies sat atop the hierarchy in the 
twentieth century, but by the twenty-first century, consumption synergies became critical as 
well. Over time scholars could then identify the conditions under which all the various forms 
of synergies are most critical. This is the kind of knowledge accumulation that could occur. 
Accumulating knowledge in this fashion can also provide a more focused and specific 
basis for assisting managers in making decisions. In the traditional aggregative approach our 
prescriptive guidance might be that “related diversification is useful”. By going to the micro-
mechanism level we can inform the managers that consumption synergies built around a brand 
extension are usually a net positive under the following conditions, x, y, z. Or that integrating 
consumption synergies built around superior experience for the customer is most useful under 
conditions a, b, c. More generally, we can advise managers to build their diversification 
strategy around clearly identified and reasoned bundles of synergies, while accounting for their 
costs, i.e. while specifically identifying those activities or products that are expected to deliver 
value super-additivity and explain why the costs of this integration are likely to be low.     
Note that synergies can arise between activities or between products or between activities 
and products. But synergies can also be conditioned by the firm’s external environment.  For 
instance, in the emerging markets, capital-raising can be challenging without an existing 
reputation (Chittoor, Kale & Puranam, 2015; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Palepu, 
2000).  In such a circumstance the financial synergy made possible in capital raising may 
swamp the “attention” costs of unrelated diversification.  However, in other environmental 
contexts the synergies/anti-synergies payoff to combining such businesses may be different.  
Similarly, unrelated diversification (in the sense of uniting into a single-corporation-operating-
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businesses with minimally correlated or negatively correlated cash-flows) may be more 
meaningful if one of the businesses is a very high-skill business. For a cyclical, high-skill 
business, cash flows from the unrelated business could provide financial flexibility and help 
avoid layoffs that may otherwise result in a serious loss of firm knowledge. Again evaluating 
the validity of this conjecture and the conditions under which the involved synergies/anti-
synergies trade-off is positive remain to be tested.    
We suggest that revitalizing existing research on corporate diversification could also serve 
as the basis of contributing to the lively debate on the relative importance of the transactions 
costs and the learning views to explain the boundaries of firms (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; 
Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1992). The recent technological changes provide 
an opportunity to investigate both these perspectives as drivers of diversification. In the last 
decade firms have been exhibiting very divergent diversification patterns. Some firms have 
been expanding their scope considerably (e.g. Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple), sometimes 
in vertical and sometimes in complementary or horizontal directions. Others are expanding 
scope in some directions (e.g. horizontal), but contracting it in others (e.g. vertical). Due to the 
significant advances in and widespread use of information technology to manage the 
coordination task, some firms have even emerged as “virtual corporations”, which contract out 
most of their key activities. However, the knowledge-based view suggests that organizations 
exist and have differential boundaries because coordination is easier inside firms due to 
common routines, collective skills and norms (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Penrose, 1959). The 
recent dynamics raise several questions. For instance, does technology reduce coordination 
costs and hence expand the optimal scope of the firm, and if so, is the “diversification carrying 
capacity” of technology-centered firms fundamentally higher? Alternatively, does technology 
reduce transaction costs across markets even more than within firms so that the optimal scope 
of the firm is now reduced? Or most likely, are there conditions under which technology 
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increases the scope of the firm and others under which it decreases it, and what precisely are 
these conditions? Again, a micro-mechanisms approach could be helpful in identifying the 
various contingencies likely to be at play. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting directions of future work may stem from questioning 
a long established premise of the diversification literature. The value of diversification has 
always been viewed from the perspective of the shareholder. Yet one might argue that, adopting 
a broader view of the firm and its responsibilities, one could ask how diversification affects the 
other stakeholders in a firm.  Most importantly, given the capital structure of the typical 
American corporation and its leverage ratio, at any point in time the combined debt and external 
liability holders have almost as much of a stake in the company as the equity holders. Yet, little 
research, if any, has identified the implications of diversification for bond and other external 
liability holders. Extending diversification research to identify synergies and anti-synergies 
inherent in diversification from the perspective of such actors may be useful complements to 
existing research.  
Indeed, an examination of some of the main effects of diversification suggests that even 
micro-mechanisms such as agency behavior by managers leading to over-diversification and 
destruction of shareholder value may create value from the bondholder’s perspective by 
providing an additional cash flow stream to secure the debt-holder’s interest in the company. 
Hence, the true total enterprise value effect (value of equity plus debt) of a given move may be 
quite different from what the very same diversification move may imply for stockholders alone.  
Examining this and related questions may provide a whole new perspective on diversification 
research. Preliminary steps have also been recently taken to investigate the relationship 
between corporate diversification and performance as part of a broader attempt to consider the 
potential distinction between different types of “owners” and different types of stakeholders of 
the firm. For example, David et al. (2010), distinguishing between the “relational” owners and 
67 
 
foreign “transactional” owners in Japanese corporations found that relational owners tend to 
prioritize growth versus profits from diversification.  This suggests that the ownership structure 
of diversified corporations may influence the outcomes they seek to optimize. Other studies 
explicitly focus on the relationship between corporate diversification and corporate social 
performance (Kang, 2013; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2001). Results show that diversification tends 
to have a positive impact of the social performance of firms, a relationship that is, however, 
negatively moderated by firm’s focus on short-term profits as measured by the firm’s return on 
equity (Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1988; Kang, 2013). More generally, looking at the contributions 
of diversification to broader measures of social performance is an arena of great potential. 
Indeed, considering some of the opportunities that emerge over the last few pages, we think 
that this could yet be the dawn of a brave new world of research on firm scope and its 
performance consequences.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. The Diversification-Performance Relationship: Core Performance Pairs 
Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Profitability measures    
Rumelt, 1974, 1982 ROC and ROE Hierarchical classification based on four 
major categories (i.e., single business, 
dominant business, related business, 
and unrelated business) 
Related diversification outperforms unrelated  
Christensen and 
Montgomery, 1981 
ROIC Rumelt Performance differences exist between some (not all) of 
Rumelt’s categories. Market characteristics are linked to those 
differences 
Bettis and Hall, 1982 ROA Rumelt Performance differences mainly relate to industry differences 
Lecraw, 1984 ROE relative to 
industry 
Rumelt (modified) Performance differences related to appropriate strategy, based 
on industry characteristics 
McDougall and Round, 
1984 
ROA Diversification dummy (questionnaire 
based) 
Performance differences depending on economic period 
Silhan and Thomas, 1986 ROA and ROC Simulated mergers Related diversification is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for firm performance 
Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 
1987 
ROA Classification into low, medium, and 
high diversification (Michel and 
Shaked, 1984) 
No significant difference in performance between strategies 
Johnson and Thomas, 
1987; Keats and Hitt, 
1988 
ROE Rumelt No significant difference in performance between strategies 
Grant and Jammine, 1988 ROE, RONA, ROS Wrigley and Rumelt Diversified firms outperform specialized firms. No difference 
between related and unrelated diversification 
Capon et al., 1988 ROC Rumelt (modified) Given the level of diversification, concentrating in one market 
improves performance 
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Amit and Livnat, 1988 FFTOA = Funds from 
operations at year t / 
Total assets at year t-
1; NITA = Net 
income at year t / 
Total assets at year t-
1 
Pure financial diversification Diversified firms had generally lower profits that undiversified 
firms 
Nguyen, Seror, and 
Devinney, 1990 
Profits to equity  Berry Herfindhal measure Related diversification is significantly related to firm’s 
profitability, no effect when market share and industry 
concentration are controlled for  
Simmonds, 1990 ROA SIC-based On average, related firms higher performers than unrelated firms 
on ROA but not on ROE, ROIC, and SGR 
Robins and Wiersema, 
1995 
ROA Portofolio interrelationships measure Corporations with more highly interrelated business portfolios 
outperform firms with lower levels of portfolio relatedness 
Mayer and Whittington, 
2003 
ROA Rumelt Related-constrained diversification is positively associated with 
firm performance 
Risk-adjusted returns    
Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 
1987 
Sharpe’s (1996); 
Treynor’s (1965) 
levered and unlevered 
measures, Jensen’s 
(1968) alpha 
Rumelt Unrelated diversifiers are better performers than related 
diversifiers 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989 Jensen (alpha) Rumelt Greater performance for constrained diversifiers  
Excess value    
Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988 
Tobin’s q Caves’ concentric index Negative association 
Lang and Stulz, 1994 Tobin’s q (1) Number of segments; (2) revenue-
based Herfindhal index; (3) asset-
based Herfindhal index 
Negative association 
Servaes, 1996 Tobin’s q Number of 2-digit codes From negative to no effect in different time periods 
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Berger and Ofek, 1995, 
1996 
Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
total value and the 
sum of imputed 
values for its 
segments as 
standalone entities 
Firms with more than one segment, sales 
above 20 million USD, and no 
segments in the financial service 
industry 
Negative association (smaller for related diversifiers) 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 
1997 
Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
total value and the 
sum of imputed 
values for its 
segments as 
standalone entities 
(1) fraction of firms with multiple 
segments; (2) number of segments; (3) 
number of 4-digit SIC codes; (4) 
revenue-based Herfindhal index; (5) 
asset-based Herfindhal index 
Limited evidence of value loss 
Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales, 2000 
Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
market value and a 
portfolio of single-
segment firms in the 
same 3-digit industry 
(asset-weighted 
average to compute 
industry averages) 
Firms with multiple segments Discount contingent on the diversity in resources and 
opportunities among divisions 
Whited, 2001 Tobin’s q Firms with multiple segments No significant difference between multi segment and single 
segment firms after accounting for measurement error in 
Tobin’s q 
Klein, 2001 Tobin’s q Firms having made at least three 
acquisitions, with more than 20% 
increase in total assets and 
involvement in ten or more 3-digit 
SIC categories or five or more 2-digit 
categories 
Discount varies over time period: conglomerates as good 
performers in the 1960s but not in the 1970s 
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Lamont and Polk, 2001 Excess value; i.e., 
Tobin’s q and 
market-sales ratio of 
the firm 
Firms with more than one segment, sales 
above 20 million USD, and no 
segments in the financial services 
industry 
Discount dependent on the level of expected cash flow and 
expected returns of the corporation 
Campa and Kedia, 2002 Log of the ratio of firm 
value to its imputed 
value (i.e., if each of 
its segments operated 
as single-segment 
firms) 
Firms with more than one segment, sales 
above 20 million USD, and no 
segments in the financial services 
industry 
No evidence of discount once the endogeneity of the 
diversification decision is taken into account 
Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, 2002 
Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
total value and the 
sum of imputed 
values for its 
segments as 
standalone entities 
Firms with more than one segment, sales 
above 20 million USD, and no 
segments in the financial services 
industry 
Diversification discount originated by the fact that acquired 
units are priced at significant discount when acquired 
Mansi and Reeb, 2002 Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
total value and the 
sum of imputed 
values for its 
segments as 
standalone entities 
(1) Dummy of firms with multiple 
segments; (2) Number of different 
segments in which firms operate 
Discount disappears when controls for leverage and risk are 
introduced 
Dittmar and Shivdasani, 
2003 
Percentage difference 
between the firm’s 
total value and the 
sum of imputed 
values for its 
segments as 
standalone entities 
Firms with multiple segments Negative association and the discount diminishes after divesture 
Gomes and Livdan, 2004 Tobin’s q Dummy of firms with multiple segments Negative 
Miller, 2006 Tobin’s q Technological diversity (based on 
breadth of patent stock) 
Positive relationship between related diversification and firm 
performance 
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Risk    
Bettis and Hall, 1982 ROA standard deviation Rumelt Not significant after taking industry effects into account 
Hill, 1983 Volatility (% change in 
ROS, ROK, or share 
price) 
Conglomerate (firms for which the 
largest single business ratio + related 
ratio is less than 0.4 and unrelated 
ratio is greater than 0.4) 
Conglomerates more volatile than non-conglomerate over the 
economic cycle 
Montgomery and Singh, 
1984 
Systematic risk (beta) Rumelt Betas for unrelated diversifiers are significantly higher 
compared to those of other firms 
Bettis and Mahajan, 1985 ROA standard deviation Rumelt Different diversification strategies can result in similar risk 
return performance 
Silhan and Thomas, 1986 Mean absolute 
percentage error 
(forecast error) 
Conglomerate Forecast error decreases as the number of segments increases 
(conglomeration as an effective risk-reduction strategy) 
Lubatkin and O’Neill, 
1987 
Systematic risk (beta) FTC classification of mergers Systematic risk declines more in the case of related diversifiers 
than in the case of unrelated mergers 
Lubatkin and O’Neill, 
1987 
Unsystematic risk FTC classification of mergers All mergers are associated with significant increase in 
unsystematic risk 
Lubatkin and O’Neill, 
1987 
Total risk FTC classification of mergers Total risk declines in related mergers 
Barton, 1988 Systematic risk (beta) Rumelt Unrelated diversifiers have higher systematic risk 
Amit and Livnat, 1988, 
1989 
Operating risk (cash-
flow variability) 
Pure financial diversification / efficient 
corporate diversification 
Pure financial diversified firms have lower operating risk 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989 Systematic risk (beta) Rumelt Constrained diversification (unrelated diversification) associated 
with lower (higher) systematic risk 
Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 
1990  
Systematic risk (beta) FTC classification of mergers Related mergers induced a downward shift in the systematic risk 
for related bidders; unrelated mergers appear to be effective at 
reducing stockholders’ risk 
Growth    
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Weston and Mansinghka, 
1971 
Sales growth, Total 
assets growth, Net 
income growth 
Firms having made at least three 
acquisitions, with more than 20% 
increase in total assets and 
involvement in ten or more 3-digit 
SIC categories or five or more 2-digit 
categories 
Conglomerates outperform other firms in growth measures 
Palepu, 1985 Profit growth Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure Firms with predominantly related diversification display 
significantly better profit growth than firms with 
predominantly unrelated diversification.  
Capon et al., 1988 Sales growth Rumelt (modified) Diversified-unicategory firms outperformed diversified-
bicategory firms on sales growth and diversified-bicategory-
single-group firms outperformed diversified-bicategory firms 
on sales growth  
Zahavi and Lavie, 2013 Sales growth Intra-industry Herfindhal Intra-industry diversity generates a U-shaped performance effect 
Innovation    
Nelson, 1959 Incentive to invest in 
basic research 
Conceptual Diversified firms have higher incentives to invest in basic 
research  
Scherer, 1965 Number of patents  Industry count Diversification correlated with inventive output, but 
diversification mostly accounting for industry differences 
Cardinal and Opler, 1995 Number of new 
products 
Relatedness ratio (proportion of a firm’s 
employees in its largest 2-digit SIC 
business) 
No statistical effect of diversification on innovative efficiency 
Stimpert and Duhaime, 
1997 
R&D expenditures Entropy measure Higher levels of diversification associated with lower levels of 
R&D expenditures 
 Investment in R&D Wrigley Related and unrelated firms invest less in R&D than dominant 
business firms; no significant difference between related and 
unrelated diversifiers 
Miller, Fern, and Cardinal, 
2007 
Patent’s impact Interdivisional self-citations The use of interdivisional knowledge positively affects the 
impact of an invention on follow-ups technological 
developments 
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Performance dimension, 
illustrative studies  
Performance  
measure employed 
Measure of diversification employed Core findings on the relationship  
between diversification and performance 
Ahuja, Lampert, and 
Tandon, 2014 
Direction of research 
effort (investment in 
paradigm-changing 
technologies) 
Relatedness across businesses The more related a firm’s businesses are, the larger its 
investments into paradigm-changing technologies and the 
smaller its investments into paradigm-deepening technologies  
Wu, 2013 New product 
introduction 
Diversification dummy (more than one 
market) 
Diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the 
current market 
Novelli, 2015 Patent scope (Number 
of patent claims, 
number of patent 
classes) 
Hall et al. (2001) classification Related diversification in a firm’s knowledge base is associated 
with a higher number of patent claims and a lower number of 
patent classes in the firm’s patents, suggesting that related 
diversification might increase firms’  ability to identify 
variations and further applications to their inventions, but it 
might also decrease the extent to which such variations are 
spread across technological domains 
Survival    
Mitchell and Singh, 1993 Survival  Expansion into new subfields (dummy) Incumbents that expand into new technical subfields survive 
longer 
Lange, Boivie, and 
Henderson, 2009 
Failure rate Entropy measure Firms diversifying into a new industry give birth to subsidiaries 
that are weaker survivors 
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Table 2. Main Contingencies Affecting The Diversification Performance Relationship 
Contingent variable Illustrative studies Core findings 
Characteristics of the industry/market in 
which a firm operates and the 
businesses in which a firm diversifies 
 
Industry profitability  Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1986 
Efficient diversifiers do better the more profitable their industries, whereas inefficient 
diversifiers prosper in less profitable environments 
Concentration in one market area 
(consumer vs. industrial) 
Capon et al., 1988 Different markets require different skills for success; hence, concentrating in one market area 
at given levels of diversification improves performance 
Business cycles Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee, 1991 
The relationship between relatedness and performance is contingent on the business cycle 
Novelty of the field in which the firm 
enters  
Mitchell and Singh, 
1993 
Entering new fields can provide economies of scope, scale, and learning as well as financial 
and R&D advantages. However, it can also increase the risk of exit due to the negative 
consequences of a potential failed expansion 
Industry lifecycles Davis and Thomas, 
1993 
As industry matures, production synergies get eliminated by dissimilarities on other 
dimensions 
Variance in R&D intensity and capital 
intensity across the line of business of 
diversified firms 
Harrison, Hall, and 
Nargundkar, 1993 
Similarities across the lines of business reflect corporate strategic consistency, which may lead 
to superior corporate performance 
Similarity of the accumulated assets Markides and 
Williamson, 1994 
Related firms outperform unrelated ones when they compete across a portfolio of markets 
where similar types of accumulated assets are important 
Diversity in resources and opportunities  Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales, 2000 
Diversity in resources and opportunities across divisions is associated with resource 
misallocation and lower performance 
Similarity between rivals in terms of 
market structure correspondence 
Li and Greenwood, 
2004 
Multi-market behaviours are associated with superior performance 
Environmental change created by the 
dynamic of other firms in the industry 
Stern and Henderson, 
2004 
The relationship between within-business diversity and survival is contingent on the amount 
of environmental change generated by the diversification and innovation dynamics of a 
firm’s competitors themselves  
Industry characteristics (number of 
diversified competitors and combined 
market share of specialized firms)  
Santalo’ and Becerra, 
2008 
Diversified firms have a better performance in industries (1) characterized by a small number 
of nondiversified competitors or (2) in which specialized firms have a small combined 
market share 
Centrality of conglomerate compared to 
specialized firms 
Anjos and Fracassi, 
2015 
High-excess-centrality conglomerates have greater value, especially in industries covered by 
fewer analysts and where soft information is important 
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Contingent variable Illustrative studies Core findings 
Financial constraints and economic 
conditions 
Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2016 
Diversification provides financial and investment advantages that are particularly valuable in 
the context of a financial crisis 
Characteristics of firms   
Organizational structure Chang and Choi, 
1988 
Business groups that have a multidivisional structure show superior economic performance 
because such structure reduces transaction costs  
Organizational structure Hoskisson, Harrison, 
and Dubofsky, 
1991 
The market reacts positively to diversified firms being organized using M-form, especially for 
unrelated diversifiers 
Organizational structure Hoskisson, Hitt, and 
Hill, 1991 
Limited diversification supported by appropriate controls (i.e., M-form) induces managerial 
risk taking, whereas high levels of diversification or extensive interdependence between 
divisions reduces managerial risk taking 
Organizational arrangements within M-
form; i.e., centralization/decentralization, 
integration, use of subjective and 
objective evaluation criteria, incentive 
schemes based on corporate profitability 
Hill, Hitt, and 
Hoskisson, 1992 
Related diversification has the potential to realize economic benefits from economies of 
scope, whereas unrelated diversification has the potential to realize economic benefits from 
governance economies. Accordingly, these two forms of diversification need appropriate 
organizational arrangements that enable this potential 
Organizational structures that enable 
resource sharing and performance 
Markides and 
Williamson, 1996 
Diversification short- and long-term advantages are conditional on organizational structures 
that allow the firm’s division to share assets 
Organizational structure of R&D research 
centers 
Cardinal and 
Hatfield, 2000 
 Firm with a separate research center will have higher levels of patent productivity than firms 
without a separate research center; this effect is greater for focused firms than for 
diversified firms 
Organizational structure (number of 
subsidiaries) 
Klein and 
Saidenberg, 2010 
Firms with many subsidiaries are less profitable than firms with fewer subsidiaries 
Compensation strategy  Gomez-Mejia, 1992 Compensation strategies affect the implementation of diversification and, in doing so, affect 
performance 
Managerial incentives Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 2003  
The link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that 
experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not  
Managerial policies to maintain 
organizational slack 
Gary, 2005 Successful diversification strategies are associated with managerial policies that maintain 
organizational slack  
Level of IT investment and performance  Chari, Devaraj and 
David, 2008 
Investment in information technology helps firms sharing and transferring resources and 
capabilities across businesses; it is more relevant for related diversifiers than for unrelated 
ones  
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Contingent variable Illustrative studies Core findings 
Level of IT investment and performance  Ray, Xue, and 
Barney, 2013 
Information technology capital enables firms with narrowly (broadly) valuable assets to be 
less (more) vertically integrated and less (more) diversified 
Security analyst ratings of voluntary 
disclosure  
Bens and Monahan, 
2004 
Positive association between the excess value of diversification and security analyst ratings of 
voluntary disclosure  
Segment disclosure Franco, Urcan, and 
Vasvari, 2016 
The negative relation between industrial diversification and bond yields becomes stronger 
when firms improve segment disclosures  
Debt level O’Brien et al., 2014 Firms returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets are enhanced 
when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly 
bond debt  
Relationship with secondary stakeholders 
and performance 
Su and Tsang, 2015 By serving as agents mitigating external constraints, secondary stakeholders positively 
moderate the relationship between product diversification and performance 
Search strategy Kim et al., 2013 A related diversification strategy leads to greater innovation when the firm employs the 
appropriate technological strategy  
Firm life cycle Arikan and Stulz, 
2016 
The value creation performance of acquiring firms varies throughout firms’ lifecycle. For 
older firms, the acquisition of public firms is associated with negative stock price reactions 
Characteristics of the diversification move  
Diversification mode (internal vs. external) Lamont and 
Anderson, 1985 
No significant difference 
Diversification mode (internal vs. external) Simmonds, 1990 No strong results but unrelated external diversification is associated with the worst 
performance 
Match between diversification strategy and 
diversification mode (internal versus 
external) 
Busija, O’Neill, and 
Zeithaml, 1997 
The type of strategy chosen and the diversification mode reinforce each other 
Diversification motive i.e., risk avoidance Hill and Hansen, 
1991 
Diversification motivated by risk avoidance does not have a positive effect on profitability 
measures and in fact, due to the costs it involves, it has a negative effect on it; instead, it 
leads to risk reduction 
Diversification motive (diversification 
oriented acquisitions and consolidation-
oriented acquisitions) and industry cycle 
Anand and Singh, 
1997 
Consolidation-oriented acquisitions outperform diversification-oriented acquisitions in the 
decline phase of their industries in terms of both ex ante (stock market based) and ex post 
(operating) performance measures  
Type of relatedness; i.e., production vs. 
marketing (performance, ROA vs. sales 
growth) 
Davis et al., 1992 Different types of functional relatedness affect different performance measures: high 
production relatedness affects ROA, while high levels of marketing relatedness positively 
affect sales growth 
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Contingent variable Illustrative studies Core findings 
Type of relatedness; i.e., product 
relatedness vs. managerial relatedness  
Ilinitch and 
Zeithaml, 1995 
Businesses in the same vertical stage of the value chain are more similar to manage than those 
in different stages 
Complementarity across different types of 
synergies 
Tanriverdi and 
Venkataraman, 
2005 
Synergies arising from product-knowledge-, customer-knowledge-, or managerial-knowledge-
relatedness do not improve corporate performance on their own, but they do so when they 
complement each other 
Type of relatedness (production and 
consumption) and performance (sales 
growth and market share) 
Tanriverdi and Lee, 
2008 
In the presence of network externalities, complementarity between related diversification in 
production and consumption leads to the achievement of positive returns to within-industry 
diversification 
Entry and exit directed by knowledge 
applicability  
Chang, 1996 Entry and exit directed by similarity in human resource profiles contribute to the improvement 
of firms’ profitability  
Type of diversification (intraindustry and 
interindustry) and complexity 
Barroso and 
Giarratana, 2013 
Within-niche product proliferation generates learning curves and positive synergies between a 
brand and a submarket niche, which expire after a certain level due to cannibalization  
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Table 3 Methodological Concerns Affecting the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
 Core issue and illustrative studies Core findings 
Measurement (diversification)  
 Montgomery, 1982 Comparison between SIC-based count measures and categorical measures of diversification. High 
convergence between the two types of measures is found. The high efficiency of SIC-based count measures 
is noted 
 Pitts and Hopkins, 1982 Comparison between business-count versus category- based measures. Business count measures appear to be 
more suitable for research comparing diversified and non-diversified firms but not for explaining the 
difference among diversified firms 
 Chatterjee and Blocher, 1992 Comparison of convergent and predictive validity of Rumelt's categorical classification and continuous 
measures of diversification (Herfindhal, weighted and entropy indexes). Not strong convergent validity of 
Rumelt's measures. Good discriminating power of continuous measures between Rumelt's measures 
 Hoskisson et al. 1993 Comparison between Rumelt's categorical measure of diversification and continuous approaches (SIC count, 
entropy). Results suggest that while using both Rumelt and entropy measures improves the accuracy of the 
study, using either of the two measures should still lead to acceptable results  
 Lubatkin, Merchant & Srinivasan, 1993 Comparison between Rumelt's categorical measure of diversification and continuous approaches. Results 
reveal high degree of correspondence between the narrow (4-digit) and broad (2-digit) spectrum measures of 
diversification and Rumelt's categorical measures 
 Hall and St. John, 1994 Comparison between Rumelt's categorical measure, continuous measures (product count and entropy) and 
continuous scores converted to strategy categories. Results report a close association between the three 
types of measures, but different performance predictions 
 Robins and Wiersema, 2003 Comparison in terms of content validity between the related component of the entropy index and the 
concentric index as measures of relatedness. The results suggest that they are sensitive to the characteristics 
of corporate portfolio composition that may not be directly linked to portfolio relatedness. 
Measurement (relatedness)  
 Ahuja, Lampert & Tandon, 2013 Relatedness measured based on common inputs  
 Farjoun, 1994; Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993; Teece,1977; 1982 
Relatedness measured based on skills and capabilities 
 Matusik and Fitza, 2003; Miller, 2006; 
Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 
1999; Tanriverdi & Venkataraman, 2005 
Relatedness measured based on technologies and knowledge assets 
 Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; St. John 
& Harrison, 1999 
Relatedness measured based on physical assets 
 Capron & Hulland, 1999 Relatedness measured based on distribution channels or product markets 
   
Measurement  (performance)  
 Bergh, 1995 Diversification is positively related to performance when data are pooled, averaged and tested cross-
sectionally; different association when tested over time 
 Whited, 2001 Measurement error in q can explain the diversification discount 
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 Villalonga, 2004 Measurement of performance based on segment data can lead to distorted results and be the origin of the 
diversification discount 
Confounders of the relationship between diversification and profitability 
 Scherer, 1965 Industry effects as confounders (the two- or three- digit industry groups with high patenting activity tend to 
host firms highly diversified) 
 Bettis, 1981 Industry effects as confounders (most related diversifiers operate in high-performing industries) 
 Christensen and Montgomery, 1981 Market structure as confounders (most related diversifiers in more profitable, highly growing and highly 
concentrated markets and most unrelated diversifiers experience low profitability, low concentration and 
low market share in their markets and this makes them more likely candidates for unrelated diversification) 
 Bettis and Hall, 1982 Industry effects as confounders 
 McDougall and Round, 1984 Economic period as confounders (diversification is associated to outperformance in periods of fluctuating 
economic activity) 
 Keats and Hitt, 1988 Environmental instability as confounders (environmental instability tends to reduce both the level of 
diversification and the operating performance) 
 Chang and Thomas, 1989 Risk-return characteristics and market power of markets served by a diversified firm as confounders (market 
effects have the most impact on the profitability of diversified firms) 
 Lamont and Polk, 2001 Discount firms have higher leverage then premium firms suggesting that leverage is a potential confounder of 
the relationship 
 Park, 2003 Industry effects as confounders (related acquirers were in more profitable industries than unrelated acquirers, 
prior to acquisition) 
 Custodio, 2014 Accounting policies as confounders (diversification discount are biased upward by the accounting implications 
of mergers and acquisitions) 
   
Form of the relationship 
 Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990  Curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance 
 Markides, 1992 Curvilinear relationship between diversification and profitability 
 Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994 Curvilinear relationship between corporate diversification and risk: diversification into similar businesses is 
superior in terms of risk minimization than that into identical or very different businesses 
 Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000 Curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance (accounting- and market-based : moderate 
levels of diversification lead to higher levels of performance than either limited or extensive diversification) 
 Matusik and Fitza, 2012 U-shaped relationship between diversification of knowledge assets and performance (IPO success rate of VC 
investments): superior results are associated with either low or high levels of diversification, while moderate 
levels yield lower results 
 Zahavi and Lavie, 2013 U-shaped relationship between intra-industry product diversity and performance (sales growth): increases in 
product diversity initially undermine performance (due to negative transfer effects) but then improve it (due 
to the increase in economies of scope) 
 Hashai, 2015 S-shaped relationship between intra-industry diversification and firm performance (ROS) 
   
Direction of causality and self-selection 
 Rumelt, 1974, 1982 Firms may be seeking diversification to escape their poor industries or poor performance 
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 Dubofski and Varadarajan, 1987 Performance might affect how a firm chooses to diversify 
 Grant, Jammine and Thomas, 1988 Causation between product diversification and profitability is weak in both directions 
 Lang and Stulz, 1994 Firms that choose to diversify are poor performers compared to firms that don't 
 Campa and Kedia, 2002 Strong negative correlation between a firm's choice to diversify and firm value 
 Park, 2003 Related acquirers more profitable in their industries than unrelated acquirers, prior to acquisition  
 Gomes and Livdan, 2004 Diversification is often the result of bad productivity shocks 
 Miller, 2004 Diversifying firms invest less in R&D and have greater breadth of technology prior to diversification. Also, 
acquiring firms appear to have lower performance due to accounting policies. Firms using internal growth 
rather than acquisition pursue less extensive diversification 
 Miller, 2006 Diversification and performance are endogenously related through a variety of mechanisms 
 Levinthal and Wu, 2010 Firms with superior capabilities in a low-value existing markets context diversify to increase their profits, but 
this is associated with lower average return due to the spread of non-scale free capabilities across 
applications 
 De Figueiredo and Rawley, 2011 When managers require external investment to expand, the discipline of markets ensures that higher-skilled 
firms will be more likely to diversify  
 Wu, 2013 More capable firms operating in markets characterized by higher demand maturity are more likely to diversify 
because they experience higher opportunity costs 
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TABLE 4 Theoretical Perspectives Underlying Synergy-Seeking Diversification 
Core theoretical 
perspectives addressing 
the phenomenon 
Illustrative 
studies 
Core assumptions/logic Types of synergies / anti-synergies that are identified 
by this theoretical perspective 
Resource-based view e.g. Markides 
and Williamson, 
1996; Penrose, 
1959; Robins 
and Wiersema, 
1995; Wan, 
Hoskisson, 
Short, Yiu, 2011 
Building on Penrose (1959) the resource-based 
view suggests that firms diversify in order to use 
their excess capacity of resources that have 
multiple uses but that are subject to market 
failure (Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1982; 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Diversification enhances performance by 
allowing firms to get access to assets that are 
strategic and that would not otherwise be 
available through the market (Markides & 
Williamson, 1996) 
 
Horizontal operating synergies (see Table 5a) and anti-
synergies (see Table 5b) 
Transaction costs 
economics 
e.g. Arrow, 
1974; Jones and 
Hill, 1988; 
Williamson, 
1975 
Firms diversify in other businesses (vertically 
related or horizontally related) if the 
internalization reduces the transaction 
difficulties that are associated to market 
exchange (Jones and Hill, 1988). For instance 
moral hazard, opportunism and information 
asymmetries between interacting businesses may 
be reduced as a result of diversification 
Vertical operating synergies (see Table 5a) and anti-
synergies (see Table 5b) 
Strategic behavior  e.g. Baum and 
Greve, 2001, 
Baum and Korn, 
1999; Li and 
Greenwood, 
2004) 
Diversification occurs because coordinating 
strategies across markets provides competition 
related benefits  
Strategic synergies (see Table 5a) and anti-synergies 
(see Table 5b) 
Financial theories of risk 
reduction and information 
efficiency 
e.g. Lewellen, 
1971 
Diversification provides opportunities to reduce 
risks that cannot be accessed by individual 
shareholders acting on their own and to exploit 
information economies 
Financial synergies (see Table 5a) and anti-synergies 
(see Table 5b) 
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TABLE 5a Mechanisms: Synergies 
Type of synergy Sub-mechanisms Illustrative studies 
Horizontal operating 
synergies: benefits that 
emerge from sharing 
assets or activities across 
businesses 
• Economies of scale and scope originating from the sharing of common core 
resources or activities across businesses that do not transact with each other, 
across time or over time 
• Economies of learning: reduction of average variable cost as cumulative 
production increases or product improvements due to advances in R&D in one 
business, which may be transferred across related businesses 
• Convenience or cost savings for customers and information economies that 
emerge from providing multiple products to a customer segment leading to  
willingness to pay complementarities  
e.g. Amit and Livnat, 1988; Bettis, 
1981; Bettis and Hall, 1982; Cardinal 
and Opler, 2009; Chatterjee, 1986; 
Clark and Huckman, 2012; 
Farjoun,1998; Grant and Jammine, 
1988; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Hitt, Hill and Hoskisson, 1992; Jones 
and Hill 1988;  Karim and Kaul, 
2014; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Markides and Williamson, 1994; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1993; 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; 
Palepu, 1985; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 
1987; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; 
Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; Rumelt, 
1974; 1982; Sakartov and Folta, 
2014; Seth, 1990; Tanriverdi and 
Venkataraman, 2005; Teece 
1980;1982; Wringley, 1970; Ye, 
Priem and Alshwer, 2012; Zenger, 
2016 
 
Vertical operating 
synergies: benefits that 
arise from conducting 
activities from 
successive stages of a 
value chain within the 
same company  
 
 
 
• Coordination benefits: Better coordination between stages of production 
reducing costs or improving the quality of the ultimate product. 
• Opportunism benefits: Countering the opportunism of buyers or suppliers 
 
e.g. Arrow, 1974; Hill and Hoskisson, 
1987; Jones and Hill, 1988; Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978; 
Williamson, 1975 
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Strategic synergies: 
benefits that arise from 
coordinating strategies 
across markets 
• Multi-market contact benefits: benefits related to the implicit coordination with 
the firm’s competitors and eventually to mutual forbearance and reduced 
competition as well as opportunity to increase barriers to entry (caveat – 
potentially illegal!) 
• Cross-subsidization and predatory pricing: Firms with multiple businesses and 
cash-flow streams may use cash generated through one business to cross-
subsidize another business thus giving the second business an advantage in its 
market and possibly engage in predatory pricing (caveat – potentially illegal!) 
• Market power benefits: Increase in market power via increase in size and 
reputation 
e.g. Amit and Livnat, 1988; Baum 
and Greve, 2001, Baum and Korn, 
1999; Chatterjee, 1986; Li and 
Greenwood, 2004; Lubatkin, 1983; 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; Karnani 
and Wernerfelt, 1985; Markham, 
1973;  Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 
1992; Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; 
Scherer, 1980 
Financial synergies: 
benefit that arise from 
the co-location of two 
businesses and their 
correspondent cash-flows 
and decision-making 
activities within the same 
legal enterprise 
• Risk-reduction benefits: If the cash-flows of the individual businesses are 
negatively correlated, the firm can realize “safer” cash flows (co-insurance) and 
decreased bankruptcy risk as well as obtain taxation benefits, increased debt 
capacity  
• Information economies: Firms could be run as internal capital market with 
headquarters having the ability to access the accounts of the individual 
businesses and thus be more efficient in its deployment of capital than entities 
that are outside the corporation and do not enjoy such preferential access to the 
accounts of the businesses. 
• Tax savings: Present value of tax savings on losses written off immediately 
across businesses  
e.g. Amit and Livnat, 1988; 
Chatterjee, 1986; Dimitrov and Tice, 
2006; Gopalan and Xie, 2011; Hill, 
Hitt and Hoskisson, 1992; Lewellen, 
1971; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; 
Lintner, 1971; Lubatkin and O'Neill, 
1987; Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1993; 
Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Seth, 
1990; Scott, 1977; Williamson, 1975 
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TABLE 5b: Mechanisms: Anti-synergies 
Type of anti-synergy Sub-mechanisms Illustrative studies 
Horizontal and vertical 
operating costs or anti-
synergies: costs that arise 
from sharing assets or 
activities across 
businesses  or from 
conducting activities from 
successive stages of a 
value chain within the 
same company  
  
• Coordination costs: costs that arise due to the coordination required to share resources 
across businesses and that relates to the complexity of organizing the use of resources 
among multiple actors/units and the costs of increases in communication and 
decisional activities required to do so  
Hashai, 2015; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; 
Jones and Hill, 1988; Keren and Levhari, 
1983; Gary, 2005; Rawley 2010; Zhou, 
2011 
• Opportunity costs of resources: costs related to the fact that at any point in time 
resources need to be allocated among alternative, competing, activities including 
opportunity costs of not investing in scale in existing markets and attention costs related 
to over-extended scientists, engineers and managers (related to the fact that congestion 
creates bottlenecks, which lead human resources to spend less time on each individual 
tasks reducing the thoroughness and overall quality of work and decision making over 
time) 
Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Gary, 2005; 
Hill and Hansen, 1991;  Levinthal and Wu, 
2010; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Mitchell and 
Singh, 1993; Penrose, 1959; Rosen, 1982; 
Sakhartov and Folta, 2015; Slater, 1980; 
Teece, 1982 Wu, 2013; Zenger, 2016 
 
• Administrative or bureaucratic costs: costs related to the inefficiencies that increase in 
organizational size and complexity tend to create, including loss of scale, increased 
operating leverage, loss of efficiency due to captive customers/ suppliers, limits to 
exploration as well as control and effort losses from potential increase in employees 
shirking  
 
Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Hill and Hansen, 
1991; Jones and Hill, 1988; Lubatkin, 
1983; Sutherland, 1980; Penrose, 1959; 
Puranam & Vanneste, 2016;Williamson, 
1975; Zenger, 2016 
• Adaptation costs/ adjustment costs/ organizational rigidity costs: costs of adapting the 
resource, routines and practices that are used in existing businesses to additional 
businesses, including the costs of inappropriate response in contexts characterized by a 
different logic, and the costs of inappropriate planning due to the overestimation of the 
similarity of different businesses 
Hashai, 2015; Leonard- Barton, 1992; 
Lubatkin and O'Neill, 1987; Kaplan and 
Henderson, 2005; Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986; Puranam & Vanneste, 2016; 
Rawley, 2010 
• Learning and absorptive capacity costs: costs that emerge from the inefficiencies 
related to learning about the new contexts 
Chavas, 2011; Markides, 1992; Markides, 
1995; Penrose, 1959; Kumar, 2009 
• Compromise costs: related to the choice of development of more generic inputs or 
assets with the purpose of increasing their usability across applications but leading to 
an undercut of its possible value addition in any specific usage. Such costs may also 
emerge from the overestimation of similarities between businesses and the potential of 
the firm to benefit by sharing resources between them  
 
Harrison, Hall and Nargundkar, 1993; Hill 
and Hoskisson, 1987; Lubatkin, 1983; 
Markides and Williamson 1994; Porter, 
1980; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; 
Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Zenger, 2016 
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Strategic costs or anti-
synergies: costs that arise 
from coordinating 
strategies across markets 
• Contagion costs: decline in the value of a brand in one product category (for instance 
by an accident) that results in declines in the value of that brand for other product 
categories as well 
Greenwood et al. 2005; Natividad and 
Sorenson, 2015; Puranam & Vanneste, 
2016 
 
Financial costs or anti- 
synergies: costs that arise 
from the co-location of 
two businesses and their 
correspondent cash-flows 
and decision-making 
activities within the same 
legal enterprise 
• Conflict costs: costs related to the non-optimization of the investment decisions and of 
the inefficient allocation of capital among different units due to the internal power 
struggles generated by diversification as well as agency and influence behavior 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kumar, 2013; 
Lyandres, 2007; Meyer, Milgrom, and 
Roberts, 1992; Rajan, Servaes, Zingales, 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Stulz, 
1990 
• Information and control costs: costs related to the inefficiencies due to executives 
information processing limits as the span of control of corporate executives as well as 
the differences among divisions increases 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Chavas, 2011; 
Hitt, Hill and Hoskisson, 1992; Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1988; Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill, 
1993; Markides, 1992; Markides, 1995; 
Myerson, 1982; Harris, Kriebel, and 
Raviv, 1982; Williamson, 1967 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 Structure of the Review 
 
